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INTERRING THE RHETORIC OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
Neil S. Siegel*
Judicial activism is a grave threat to the rule of law because unac-
countable federal judges are usurping democracy, ignoring the Con-
stitution and its separation of powers, and imposing their personal
opinions upon the public.  This must stop.1
INTRODUCTION
For decades, leaders of the Republican Party have decried “judicial
activism” and championed “judicial restraint.”  For much of that time,
Republican politicians have equated judicial restraint with a commit-
ment to judicial deference, asserting that “activist” judges disrespect
the will of popular majorities.  More recently, as the Republican Party
has solidified its control of the federal courts and made its own claims
on the Constitution, Republican politicians have tended to define ju-
dicial activism in potentially conflicting ways, mixing deference frames
with claims about the autonomy of law from mere politics or personal
beliefs.
In this Article, I examine these two ways of understanding the Re-
publican rhetoric of judicial activism, and I show that each of them is
problematic.  First, equating judicial activism with the refusal to show
deference to elected officials is inconsistent with much of modern Re-
publican politics and with the views of the four U.S. Supreme Court
Justices who are most admired in Republican political circles—Chief
Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. and Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence
Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito, Jr.  Second, redefining judicial activism
as a scarlet letter for judges who follow their personal beliefs instead
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conments, I am grateful to Sara Beale, Stuart Benjamin, Curtis Bradley, Paul Carrington, Guy
Charles, Erwin Chemerinsky, Jim Cox, Shari Diamond, Michael Gerhardt, James Gibson, R.
Craig Green, Jamal Greene, Mitu Gulati, John Inazu, Stephan Landsman, Richard Lempert,
Hans Linnartz, Bill Marshall, Ralf Michaels, Jedediah Purdy, Lori Ringhand, James Salzman,
Reva Siegel, Neil Vidmar, Jonathan Weiner, and, especially, Robert Post.  I thank Natalie
Bedoya, Justin Jesse, and Nicholas Collevecchio for able research assistance, and Stephan Lands-
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1. Republican National Committee, 2008 Republican Platform, Government Reform, http://
www.gop.com/2008Platform/GovernmentReform.htm (last visited June 9, 2009) [hereinafter
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of “the law” invites charges of hypocrisy for switching definitions, and
presupposes an unsustainably sharp distinction between constitutional
politics and constitutional law—as evidenced by the close correspon-
dence between personal views and legal views among the very people
who assert an antinomy between the two.
In short, I argue that Republican rhetoric about judges either rests
on a defensible definition of judicial activism that is nonetheless con-
trary to actual Republican practice, or else rests on an indefensible
definition of judicial activism because it mischaracterizes the actual
practice of constitutional adjudication in the United States.  My analy-
sis suggests that the rhetoric of judicial activism is deployed to con-
demn particular views on particular issues and not to express a
genuine commitment to judicial deference or to the ideal of fidelity to
law.
To be sure, the rhetoric of judicial activism has been with us for a
long time now, and many commentators in legal or public discourse
have criticized it in various ways.2  But activism talk continues to war-
rant close inspection because Republican politicians continue to de-
ploy it, including during the 2008 presidential campaign and during
the Supreme Court confirmation process of then-Judge Sonia
Sotomayor.  By all appearances, Republican politicians mean for such
rhetoric to be taken seriously.  Taking it seriously reveals a disconnect
with the reality of Republican practice and a denial of the existence of
irreconcilable disagreement about constitutional meaning.
Part II illustrates the rhetoric of judicial activism that has long been
present in Republican claims about judges.3  Among other things, I
note the increasing extent to which talk of antidemocratic meddling
has shared air time with talk of legal infidelity.4
Part III considers the charge that judicial activists fail to show
proper deference.5  I examine the constitutional commitments of the
contemporary Republican Party, first by noting the judicial decisions
that the party most frequently praises or condemns, and then by ana-
2. For an overview of the political and academic debate over judicial activism, see STEFANIE
A. LINDQUIST & FRANK B. CROSS, MEASURING JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 1–28 (2009).  “For the most
part,” Lindquist and Cross note, “those who decry activist decisions focus on the judiciary’s
usurpation of political power from the elected branches, especially when judges render those
decisions in accordance with their own policy preferences.” Id. at 1.  “[J]udicial activism has
become synonymous with judicial decision making that inappropriately crowds out the policy-
making prerogatives of the elected branches.” Id. at 1–2. See generally Craig Green, An Intellec-
tual History of Judicial Activism, 58 EMORY L.J. 1195 (2009) (collecting sources that use or ana-
lyze the language of judicial activism).
3. See infra notes 12–86.
4. See infra notes 12–86.
5. See infra notes 87–183.
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lyzing the judicial practices of Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito.6  I inquire whether the positions of those
Justices on the axis of judicial nonintervention or intervention are dis-
cernibly different from the positions of the four Justices whom the
Republican Party has criticized most forcefully—Justices John Paul
Stevens, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G.
Breyer.7
Part IV considers a second possible way of understanding the Re-
publican rhetoric of judicial activism: the accusation that judicial activ-
ists follow their personal views instead of “the law.”8  I show that this
accusation, which is being made with increasing frequency, is pro-
foundly misleading.9
Part V anticipates objections that I have let the Democratic Party
off the hook.10  To be clear, I readily acknowledge—indeed, under-
score—a number of charges against Democratic politicians, including
their failure to talk much about the judicial stakes in national elec-
tions.  My purpose is not to argue that one party is more candid or
consistent than the other as a general matter.  I do maintain, however,
that various cogent criticisms of the Democrats do not in any way
lessen the culpability of Republican politicians for continuing to rail
against judicial activism when they do not possess a genuine commit-
ment to judicial deference and when the Constitution does not clearly
mean what they say it means.
I conclude by suggesting what Americans may have to gain, both
instrumentally and noninstrumentally, by interring the rhetoric of ju-
dicial activism.11
II. POLITICAL RHETORIC
For a long time now, Republican politicians have asserted that, un-
like “activist” liberal judges, the jurists they favor practice “judicial
restraint” in the sense that they show real respect for the views and
6. See infra notes 87–99.
7. See infra notes 100–175.  It is more controversial to characterize perceptions of Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy.  As illustrated by many of the cases discussed in this Article, he does not
reliably fall within one ideological block or the other.  It is relevant in this regard that Kennedy
was President Ronald Reagan’s third choice to fill Justice Lewis Powell’s seat.  I omit discussion
of Justice Sonia Sotomayor because she joined the Court only recently.
8. See infra notes 184–198.
9. See infra notes 184–198.
10. See infra notes 204–208.
11. See infra notes 209–219.
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values of popular majorities.12  “For decades, in fact, the standard con-
servative view of the Supreme Court has amounted to a critique of
liberal ‘judicial activism’ and a call for ‘judicial restraint.’”13  Such lan-
guage has not always been used with clarity, “but if judicial restraint
means anything in the context of the long conservative critique of the
Warren Court and its legacy, it must mean a relative unwillingness to
declare constitutional limitations on government, or a relative unwill-
ingness to become involved in heated political questions.”14
Republican politicians directed charges of activism at the Warren
Court and its defenders before coming to power with the election of
President Richard M. Nixon in 1968.  Moreover, notwithstanding
many ensuing changes in the party and the country, they have contin-
ued to espouse this rhetoric.  Over time, however, the rhetoric of judi-
cial activism has increasingly become associated with multiple,
potentially conflicting meanings.  The early emphasis on the need for
greater judicial deference endures, but it presently exists alongside a
second critique of judicial activism: condemnation of judicial lawless-
ness in pursuit of a personal agenda.  According to the latter concep-
tion of activism, excessive judicial deference is as much an evil to be
avoided as excessive judicial intervention.
During his 1968 presidential campaign, Nixon vowed to appoint
“strict constructionists” to the Court.15  In fleshing out the meaning of
that term, he condemned the Warren Court for its enforcement of in-
dividual rights in areas such as criminal procedure and school desegre-
gation, blaming the Court for causing a rise in violent crime in the
country and compromising the authority of local school boards.16  For
example, at the 1968 Republican National Convention, Nixon reached
out to southern delegates by stressing the limited role that he thought
the federal courts should play in desegregating public schools:
12. In this inquiry, I focus on criticisms directed at the judiciary by leaders of the Republican
Party.  Unless I am quoting others, I tend not to describe those criticisms as “conservative” in
order to avoid the problems one encounters in attempting to define “conservatism.”  For a lucid
discussion of this issue, see Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1139, 1181–1209 (2002).
13. THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE ROAD TO
MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM 1 (2004).  Professor Keck investigates how “a judicial conser-
vatism born in reaction to the liberal judicial activism of the Warren Court has come to create
not judicial restraint but instead its own version of judicial activism.” Id. at 2.
14. Id. at 1.
15. See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS IN-
FLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 282 (2009)
(“Nixon was explicit about what he wanted from his nominees . . . .  Repeatedly he insisted that
what he sought were ‘strict constructionists.’”).
16. For a discussion, see KECK, supra note 13, at 107–13.
2010] RHETORIC OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 559
I want men on the Supreme Court who are strict constitutionalists,
men that interpret the law and don’t try to make the law. . . .  I
know there are a lot of smart judges, believe me—and probably a
lot smarter than I am—but I don’t think there is any court in this
country, any judge in this country, either local or on the Supreme
Court—any court, including the Supreme Court of the U.S.—that is
qualified to be a local school district and to make the decisions as
your local school board.17
Nixon phrased his opposition to busing in the language of judicial def-
erence to the expertise of local authority, not in the language of oppo-
sition to the vision of racial equality that the federal courts were
seeking to enforce in the wake of Brown v. Board of Education.18
The logic of judicial deference continued as a dominant theme in
Republican politics during the Reagan era.  “Like Richard Nixon
before him, Ronald Reagan entered office on a platform that included
strong opposition to judicial activism, proclaiming that he would ap-
point only judges ‘who understand the danger of short-circuiting the
electoral process and disenfranchising the people through judicial ac-
tivism.’”19  The 1980 Republican Party Platform asserted that Reagan,
unlike President Jimmy Carter, would appoint judges “who respect
and reflect the values of the American people, and whose judicial phi-
losophy is characterized by the highest regard for protecting the rights
17. Id. at 112.
18. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  The recently revealed Nixon tapes suggest that his concerns were
more substantive than procedural:
On Jan. 23, 1973, when the Supreme Court struck down laws criminalizing abortion in
Roe v. Wade, President Richard M. Nixon made no public statement.  But privately,
newly released tapes reveal, he expressed ambivalence.  Nixon . . . saw a need for abor-
tion in some cases—like interracial pregnancies, he said.  “There are times when an
abortion is necessary.  I know that.  When you have a black and a white,” he told an
aide, before adding, “Or a rape.”
Charlie Savage, On Nixon Tapes, Ambivalence over Abortion, Not Watergate, N.Y. TIMES, June
24, 2009, at A1.  Hugh Davis Graham writes,
On black Americans, Nixon’s views were unambiguous.  On April 28, 1969, discussing
welfare, [Chief of Staff H.R.] Haldeman recorded [in his daily diaries]: “P emphasized
that you have to face the fact that the whole problem is really the blacks.  The key is to
devise a system that recognizes this while not appearing to.  Problem with overall wel-
fare plan is that it forces poor whites into same position as blacks (p. 53).”  Nixon
pointed out that “there has never in history been an adequate black nation, and they
are the only race of which this is true.”
Hugh Davis Graham, Richard Nixon and Civil Rights: Explaining an Enigma, 26 PRESIDENTIAL
STUD. Q. 93, 98 (1996); id. (“Nixon told [Assistant to the President John] Ehrlichman to move
fast on developing a constitutional amendment banning school busing for racial balance.  ‘Feels
we should bite bullet now and hard, if its [sic] called racism, so be it!’”).
19. LINDQUIST & CROSS, supra note 2, at 6–7 (quoting Ronald Reagan, Remarks During a
White House Briefing for United States Attorneys, in 21 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1276 (Oct.
21, 1985)).
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of law-abiding citizens.”20  The first claim seems to be about respect
for the values of popular majorities and disrespect for the values of
presumably liberal elites whose views were alleged to be over-
represented on the federal courts.  The second claim, although
phrased in the language of rights, actually seems to signal the party’s
continued endorsement of a narrow view of the rights of criminal de-
fendants, a view that Reagan voiced while he was running for presi-
dent.  The 1980 Platform also expressed implicit disapproval of the
Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence by calling for “the ap-
pointment of judges at all levels of the judiciary who respect tradi-
tional family values and the sanctity of innocent human life.”21
Interestingly, the Platform stated a preference for judges “whose
judicial philosophy . . . is consistent with the belief in the decentraliza-
tion of the federal government and efforts to return decisionmaking
power to state and local elected officials.”22  There was no overt rec-
ognition of the implications that such a commitment would have for
the exercise of judicial power—specifically, whether invalidating con-
gressional legislation on federalism grounds might fail to “respect and
reflect the values of the American people.”23
On the campaign trail, Reagan deployed the rhetoric of judicial ac-
tivism.  For instance, he claimed during a presidential debate in Cleve-
land that he opposed the Equal Rights Amendment, despite being
“for equal rights,” because “the amendment will take this problem out
of the hands of elected legislators and put it in the hands of unelected
judges.”24  During his first term, President Reagan contrasted the
Court’s act of “raw judicial power” in Roe v. Wade25 with the “respect
for the sacred value of human life [that] is too deeply engrained in the
hearts of our people to remain forever suppressed,” even though “the
great majority of the American people have not yet made their voices
heard.”26  President Reagan thus contrasted the misdeeds of judges
who overprotect women’s rights with the more enlightened views of
the American public regarding fetal life.
20. Republican National Convention, Republican Party Platform of 1980, http://www.presi-




24. Governor Ronald Reagan, Presidential Debates Between President Jimmy Carter and
Governor Ronald Reagan in Cleveland, Ohio (Oct. 28, 1980), available at http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=29408 (last visited June 9, 2009).
25. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
26. Ronald Reagan, Abortion and the Conscience of the Nation, 9 HUM. LIFE REV. 7, 7–8
(1983) (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 179, 222 (1973) (White, J., dissenting)).
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The 1984 Platform devoted substantially more space to the judici-
ary.  The demand for judicial deference was explicit and vehement,
even to the point of threatening to strip the federal courts of their
subject matter jurisdiction.27
[J]udicial power must be exercised with deference towards State
and local officials; it must not expand at the expense of our repre-
sentative institutions.  It is not a judicial function to reorder the eco-
nomic, political, and social priorities of our nation.  The intrusion of
the courts into such areas undermines the stature of the judiciary
and erodes respect for the rule of law.  Where appropriate, we sup-
port congressional efforts to restrict the jurisdiction of federal
courts.
We commend the President for appointing federal judges commit-
ted to the rights of law-abiding citizens and traditional family val-
ues.  We share the public’s dissatisfaction with an elitist and
unresponsive federal judiciary.  If our legal institutions are to regain
respect, they must respect the people’s legitimate interests in a sta-
ble, orderly society.  In his second term, President Reagan will con-
tinue to appoint Supreme Court and other federal judges who share
our commitment to judicial restraint.28
Notwithstanding this asserted commitment to judicial deference, the
Platform subsequently endorsed property rights, speech rights in the
context of campaign activity, and the constitutional rights of the
unborn.29
During his second term, President Reagan continued to condemn
judicial activism, stressing the need for judicial deference to popular
majorities and, notably, judicial lawlessness in pursuit of personal
views about what the law should be.30  In a 1986 interview, for exam-
ple, in response to questions about the Court’s enforcement of indi-
vidual rights in the areas of abortion, school prayer, and busing, the
President declared that he felt “very strongly about those social is-
sues,” and that his Supreme Court nominees—Antonin Scalia and
William Rehnquist—would “interpret the law and not write the
27. For a discussion of Reagan-era jurisdiction-stripping bills concerning school prayer and
abortion, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 277 (6th ed. 2009).
28. Republican National Convention, 1984 Republican Platform, http://www.presidency.ucsb.
edu/ws/index.php?pid=25845 (last visited June 9, 2009).
29. Id.
30. For purposes of this inquiry, it is not necessary to establish exactly when this second un-
derstanding of judicial activism first emerged in Republican rhetoric about judges.  It is evident,
however, that the language of Republican mobilization during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s
tended to criticize judges who failed to defer to electorally accountable government officials, and
that at some point the second conception of judicial activism also became prominent—to the
point where, eventually, Republican politicians felt substantially more free than their predeces-
sors did to condemn judges who practiced judicial deference.
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law.”31  He insisted that “[w]e’ve had too many examples in recent
years of courts and judges legislating.  They’re not interpreting what
the law says and whether someone was violated or not.  In too many
instances they have been actually legislating by legal decree what they
think the law should be.”32
Reagan’s Vice President, George H. W. Bush, echoed Reagan’s ju-
dicial rhetoric in his own presidential campaign.  During a presidential
debate in Los Angeles in October 1988, Bush stated that he would
“appoint people to the Federal Bench that will not legislate from the
Bench, who will interpret the Constitution.”33  Similarly, during his
1992 acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention in
Houston, President George W. Bush said that “Clinton and Congress
will stock the judiciary with liberal judges who write laws they can’t
get approved by the voters.”34
The writings of influential Republican judges and academics during
the 1970s and 1980s were consistent with the rhetoric of Republican
presidents and party platforms.  Then-Justice Rehnquist rejected “the
notion of a living Constitution.”35  Such a notion, he feared, poten-
tially empowered individuals to persuade “one or more appointed fed-
eral judges to impose on other individuals a rule of conduct that the
popularly elected branches of government would not have enacted
and the voters have not and would not have embodied in the Consti-
tution.”36  In a similar vein, Raoul Berger famously decried “govern-
ment by judiciary.”37
Others, such as Judge Robert Bork and Justice Scalia, stressed that
“originalist” constitutional interpretation would cause courts to defer
to assertions of governmental authority.38  As Keith Whittington ob-
31. Jack Nelson et al., Interview Text: Reagan’s Thoughts on Arms Talks, “Star Wars”, L.A.
TIMES, June 24, 1986, at 18.
32. Id.
33. Vice President George H.W. Bush, Presidential Debate at the University of California in
Los Angeles (Oct. 13, 1988), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=
29412 (last visited June 9, 2009).
34. George H.W. Bush, Remarks Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Republican
National Convention in Houston (Aug. 20, 1992), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
ws/print.php?pid=21352 (last visited June 9, 2009).
35. William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 703
(1976).
36. Id. at 706.
37. See generally RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977).
38. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW 170–71 (1990); Antonin Scalia, Originalism:  The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849,
862 (1989).  “Contrary to the plan of the American government,” Robert Bork asserted, “the
Supreme Court has usurped the powers of the people and their elected representatives.” ROB-
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serves, “The originalist Constitution, as these writers imagined it, was
primarily concerned with empowering popular majorities.”39  Like-
wise, as Reva Siegel explains, these “originalists believed that original-
ism would promote democratic values indirectly, by disciplining
judicial interpretation and thus limiting the reach of constitutional
law.”40
The 1996 Republican Party Platform insisted that the Constitution
“has been scorned by liberal Democrats and the judicial activism of
the judges they have appointed.”41  The party clamored for judicial
deference to popular majorities, limits on individual rights, and an end
to the judicial imposition of personal views in the name of the law:
Some members of the federal judiciary . . . .  make up laws and
invent new rights as they go along, arrogating to themselves powers
King George III never dared to exercise.  They free vicious
criminals, pamper felons in prison, frivolously overturn State laws
enacted by citizen referenda . . . .
. . . .
The federal judiciary, including the U.S. Supreme Court, has
overstepped its authority under the Constitution.  It has usurped the
right of citizen legislators and popularly elected executives to make
law by declaring duly enacted laws to be “unconstitutional” through
the misapplication of the principle of judicial review.  Any other
role for the judiciary, especially when personal preferences mas-
querade as interpreting the law, is fundamentally at odds with our
system of government in which the people and their representatives
decide issues great and small.42
ERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARD GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DE-
CLINE 109 (1996).
39. Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 602 (2004).
40. Reva B. Siegel, Heller & Originalism’s Dead Hand—In Theory and Practice, 56 UCLA L.
REV. 1399, 1406 (2009).
41. Republican National Convention, Republican Party Platform of 1996, http://www.presi-
dency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=25848 (last visited June 9, 2009) [hereinafter 1996 Republican
Party Platform].
42. Id.  Similar language appeared in the 2000 Republican Party Platform:
Many judges disregard the safety, values, and freedom of law-abiding citizens.  At the
expense of our children and families, they make up laws, invent new rights, free vicious
criminals, and pamper felons in prison.  They have arbitrarily overturned state laws
enacted by citizen referenda, utterly disregarding the right of the people and the demo-
cratic process.
The sound principle of judicial review has turned into an intolerable presumption of
judicial supremacy.  A Republican Congress, working with a Republican president, will
restore the separation of powers and reestablish a government of law.  There are differ-
ent ways to achieve that goal—setting terms for federal judges, for example, or using
Article III of the Constitution to limit their appellate jurisdiction—but the most impor-
tant factor is the appointing power of the presidency.  We applaud Governor Bush’s
pledge to name only judges who have demonstrated that they share his conservative
beliefs and respect the Constitution.
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The Republican Party thus compared the federal courts to the British
King who was on the receiving end of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence.  That comparison reflected the vigor with which the party was
pushing its demand for judges to get out of the way.  Yet at the same
time, the party continued promising to “restore the force of the Tenth
Amendment and, in the process, renew the trust and respect which
hold together a free society.”43  This was a promise that seemed to
entail, among other things, the exercise of judicial power in order to
limit federal power.
Like Presidents Nixon, Reagan, and George H. W. Bush before
him, then-Governor George W. Bush forcefully espoused the rhetoric
of judicial activism when he ran for president.  During a presidential
debate in Boston in 2000, Governor Bush adopted Nixon’s language
in stating that he would appoint judges “who will strictly interpret the
Constitution and not use the bench for writing social policy.”44  Ac-
cording to Bush, “[T]he judges ought not to take the place of the legis-
lative branch of government. . . .  I don’t believe in liberal activist
judges.  I believe in strict constructionists.”45  Although not stated ex-
plicitly, the primary implication seems to be that activist judges pro-
tect nonexistent rights, whether by failing to show proper deference to
the elected branches or by lawlessly pursuing personal views of the
public good.  Judges who do not limit the discretion of legislatures do
not “take the place of the legislative branch of government.”46
Similarly, during his reelection campaign, President George W.
Bush described himself as “a person who believes in judicial restraint,
as opposed to judicial activism that takes the place of the legislative
branch.”47  And in his 2004 acceptance speech at the Republican Na-
tional Convention in New York City, Bush declared that he “sup-
port[s] the protection of marriage against activist judges.”48  In a
subsequent presidential debate in St. Louis, he again echoed President
Nixon when he insisted that his nominees to the bench “would be
Republican National Convention, Republican Party Platform of 2000, http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=25849 (last visited June 15, 2009) [hereinafter 2000 Republican Party
Platform].  For a discussion of the import of the last sentence in the above quotation, see infra
note 185 and accompanying text.
43. 1996 Republican Party Platform, supra note 42.
44. President George W. Bush, Presidential Debate in Boston (Oct. 3, 2000), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=29418 (last visited June 9, 2009).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. LINDQUIST & CROSS, supra note 2, at 18.
48. George W. Bush, Remarks Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Republican Na-
tional Convention in New York City, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1797, 1800 (Sept. 2, 2004),
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=72727.
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strict constructionists.  We’ve got plenty of lawmakers in Washington,
DC.  Legislators make law.  Judges interpret the Constitution.”49
Moreover, at a debate in Tempe, Arizona, he explained that he had
proposed a constitutional amendment that would have banned gay
marriage because he “was worried that activist judges are actually de-
fining the definition of marriage.”50  The President was “deeply con-
cerned that judges are making those decisions and not the citizenry of
the United States,” and that “we’ll end up with marriage being de-
fined by courts.  And I don’t think that’s in our Nation’s interest.”51
The 2004 Republican Platform explicitly appealed to the values and
democratic authority of the American people:
In the federal courts, scores of judges with activist backgrounds in
the hard-left now have lifetime tenure.  Recent events have made it
clear that these judges threaten America’s dearest institutions and
our very way of life.  In some states, activist judges are redefining
the institution of marriage.  The Pledge of Allegiance has already
been invalidated by the courts once, and the Supreme Court’s ruling
has left the Pledge in danger of being struck down again—not be-
cause the American people have rejected it and the values that it
embodies, but because a handful of activist judges threaten to over-
turn commonsense and tradition.  And while the vast majority of
Americans support a ban on partial birth abortion, this brutal and
violent practice will likely continue by judicial fiat.  We believe that
the self-proclaimed supremacy of these judicial activists is antitheti-
cal to the democratic ideals on which our nation was founded.52
The party thus placed front and center what “the American people”
have or have not “rejected”; the considered views of “the vast major-
ity of Americans”; and “the democratic ideals on which our nation
was founded.”53  The 2004 Platform suggested use of jurisdiction strip-
ping “in instances where judges are abusing their power by banning
the use of ‘under God’ in the Pledge of Allegiance or prohibiting de-
pictions of the Ten Commandments, and potential actions invalidating
the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).”54  The Platform further
“condemn[ed] judicial activists and their unwarranted and unconstitu-
tional restrictions on the free exercise of religion in the public
49. President George W. Bush, Presidential Debate in St. Louis, Missouri (Oct. 8, 2004), avail-
able at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=72776 (last visited June 9, 2009).
50. President George W. Bush, Presidential Debate in Tempe, Arizona (Oct. 13, 2004), availa-
ble at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=63163 (last visited June 9, 2009).
51. Id.
52. Republican National Convention, 2004 Republican Party Platform: A Safer World and a
More Hopeful America, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=25850 (last visited
June 15, 2009) [hereinafter 2004 Republican Party Platform].
53. Id.
54. Id.
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square.”55  In 2003 and 2005, Republicans in Congress introduced sev-
eral jurisdiction-stripping bills, which passed the House but did not
progress in the Senate.56
In nominating John Roberts for a seat on the Supreme Court, Presi-
dent Bush stated that Roberts would “strictly apply the Constitution
and laws, not legislate from the bench.”57  Similarly, in nominating
Samuel Alito to the Supreme Court, the President said that Alito “un-
derstands that judges are to interpret the laws, not to impose their
preferences or priorities on the people.”58  In a radio address a few
months later, the President stressed then-Judge Alito’s record, which
“shows that he strictly and fairly interprets the Constitution and laws
and does not try to legislate from the bench or impose his personal
preference on the people.”59  As with several of the other statements
recorded above, the primary image conveyed by the President’s words
is that of judges who interfere inappropriately with what popular ma-
jorities want to do; judges who decline to impose constitutional limits
on the discretion of popular majorities are not well described as
“legislat[ing] from the bench” or “impos[ing] their preferences or pri-
orities on the people.”
In campaigning for president, Senator John McCain made full-
throated use of the rhetoric of judicial activism.  For example, in May
2008, he delivered remarks on his judicial philosophy at Wake Forest
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitu-
tionality of Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 192 (2007).  Professor
Pfander notes,
The House of Representatives has considered and adopted a wide range of jurisdiction-
stripping legislation in the last few years.  Touching such subjects as gay and lesbian
marriage, the Pledge of Allegiance, and official acknowledgment of God by public offi-
cials, the bills follow a consistent pattern: They deny the lower federal courts jurisdic-
tion over certain controversial issues of constitutional law, and forbid the Supreme
Court from exercising appellate jurisdiction over those same issues.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also 2004 Republican Party Platform, supra note 53, at n.1 (discussing
the details of the bills); FALLON ET AL., supra note 27, at 277 (discussing the House’s passage in
2004 of the Marriage Protection Act and the Pledge Protection Act).
57. George W. Bush, Address to the Nation Announcing the Nomination of John G. Roberts,
Jr., to Be an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 1192, 1192 (July 19, 2005), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/
releases/2005/07/20050719-7.html.
58. George W. Bush, Remarks Announcing the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr., to Be an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC.
1625, 1626 (Oct. 31, 2005), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/re-
leases/2005/10/20051031.html.
59. George W. Bush, The President’s Radio Address, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 74, 75
(Jan. 14, 2006), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/01/
20060114.html.
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University in Winston-Salem, North Carolina.60  Those remarks
amounted mostly to an attack on judicial meddling in the political pro-
cess.  Although “the framers knew exactly what they were doing, and
the system of checks and balances rarely disappoints,” McCain identi-
fied “one great exception in our day”:
[T]he common and systematic abuse of our federal courts by the
people we entrust with judicial power.  For decades now, some fed-
eral judges have taken it upon themselves to pronounce and rule on
matters that were never intended to be heard in courts or decided
by judges.  With a presumption that would have amazed the framers
of our Constitution, and legal reasoning that would have mystified
them, federal judges today issue rulings and opinions on policy
questions that should be decided democratically.  Assured of life-
time tenures, these judges show little regard for the authority of the
president, the Congress, and the states.  They display even less in-
terest in the will of the people.61
“Often,” McCain continued, “political causes are brought before the
courts that could not succeed by democratic means, and some federal
judges are eager to oblige.”62
As an example of a case in which “the expressed will of the voters is
disregarded by federal judges,” McCain discussed the Supreme
Court’s invalidation of the juvenile death penalty in Roper v. Sim-
mons,63 the result of which was to “brush off the standards of the peo-
ple themselves and their elected representatives.”64  McCain also
discussed the Ninth Circuit’s invalidation of voluntary recitations of
the words “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance in public
schools,65 criticizing Michael Newdow’s constitutional claim and the
Ninth Circuit’s agreement with “litigious people [who] seek to rid our
country of any trace of religious devotion.”66  With no sense of awk-
wardness, McCain sandwiched in between those criticisms his disap-
proval of the Court’s display of deference to popular majorities in
Kelo v. City of New London, a case in which the Court upheld the
authority of local governments to allow economic development
takings.67
60. Press Release, Senator John McCain, Remarks by John McCain on Judicial Philosophy
(May 6, 2008), available at 2008 WLNR 8446630.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
64. Remarks by John McCain on Judicial Philosophy, supra note 61.
65. Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom. Elk Grove Unified
Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (declining to decide the merits and reversing the judg-
ment of the Ninth Circuit on grounds of prudential standing).
66. Remarks by John McCain on Judicial Philosophy, supra note 61.
67. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
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McCain contrasted “judicial activism” with “real activism in our
country,” which “is democratic.  Real activists seek to make their case
democratically—to win hearts, minds, and majorities to their cause.”68
In sharp contrast, “activist lawyers and activist judges follow a differ-
ent method.  They want to be spared the inconvenience of campaigns,
elections, legislative votes, and all of that.  They don’t seek to win de-
bates on the merits of their argument; they seek to shut down debates
by order of the court.”69
Speaking directly about his potential opponents in the general elec-
tion, McCain noted that then-Senators Obama and Clinton “are both
lawyers themselves, and don’t seem to mind at all when fundamental
questions of social policy are preemptively decided by judges instead
of by the people and their elected representatives.”70  McCain vowed
“to restore humility to the federal courts” by appointing judges with
“a proven commitment to judicial restraint,” judges who “understand
that there are clear limits to the scope of judicial power.”71
In sum, although there have been substantial changes in conserva-
tive political mobilization, the Republican electoral coalition, and the
country since the 1960s,72 the theme of judicial deference to legislative
majorities has often dominated Republican rhetoric about the appro-
priate exercise of judicial authority.  Calls for greater judicial respect
for the political process characterized the language of conservative
mobilization before the Republican Party took control of the presi-
dency and, generally, the federal courts, and this rhetoric has re-
mained prominent in Republican political discourse about judges ever
since.
It is evident from this brief account, however, that an exclusive fo-
cus on judicial deference does not capture the complexity and poten-
tial conflict in the judicial rhetoric of Republican politicians.  At times,
activism talk seems to have as much to do with judges who are guided
by their merely personal views as it has to do with judges who disre-
spect popular majorities.  Some of the quotations discussed above can
be construed as charges of legal infidelity, not necessarily as failures to
defer.  For example, the accusation that judges are “legislating from
the bench” and “imposing personal views” may imply a failure to
show proper deference,73 but it may also suggest lawlessness in pursuit




72. For an analysis of those issues, see generally, for example, KECK, supra note 13.
73. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Consent of the Governed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2006 (“In
promising that the justices he appoints ‘will not legislate from the bench and will strictly inter-
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of a personal agenda.74  Indeed, it can be difficult to disentangle the
two claims.
Other recent examples can be read both ways.  In defending his
nomination of Harriet Miers for a seat on the Supreme Court, Presi-
dent George W. Bush mixed a deference frame with talk about the
autonomy of law from mere politics or personal beliefs:
She shares my belief that judges should strictly interpret the Consti-
tution and laws, not legislate from the bench.  She understands that
the role of a judge is to interpret the text of the Constitution and
statutes as written, not as he or she might wish they were written.
And she knows that judges should have a restrained and modest
role in our constitutional democracy.75
Similarly, in speaking at a Federalist Society event near the end of his
presidency, President George W. Bush stated that “the proper role of
judges” is “to apply the laws as written, and not to advance their own
agendas” because “elected officials, not appointed judges,” are sup-
posed “to represent the popular will.”76  Criticizing the Democratic
Party’s “concept of a ‘living Constitution’” because it “gives unelected
judges wide latitude in creating new laws and policies without ac-
countability to the people,” Bush touted the insistence of his party
“that the Constitution means what it says.”77  He contrasted “judges
who would faithfully interpret the Constitution” with judges who “in-
vent laws or dictate social policy.”78  And he endorsed Chief Justice
Roberts’s statement during his Supreme Court confirmation hearing
that “[j]udges are like umpires.”79
pret the Constitution,’ Bush has faithfully recited the mantra that conservatives regularly use to
signal their belief that the Supreme Court should defer to democratic decision making.”).
74. Professors Lindquist and Cross write,
The trouble with identifying activism in the sense implied by the phrase “legislating
from the bench” . . . is that some decisions may be so clearly legally justified that no
observer would complain about the Court’s action. . . .  The true complaint is about
striking down legislation as unconstitutional when it is done to further judges’ personal
policy preferences.
LINDQUIST & CROSS, supra note 2, at 39.
75. George W. Bush, The President’s Radio Address, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1523,
1524 (Oct. 8, 2005), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/
10/20051008.html.
76. George W. Bush, Remarks to the Cincinnati Chapter of the Federalist Society in Cincin-
nati, Ohio, 44 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1303, 1303 (Oct. 6, 2008).
77. Id. at 1304.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1305.  “Judges and Justices are servants of the law, not the other way around,”
Roberts said.  “Judges are like umpires.  Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them.  The
role of an umpire and a judge is critical.  They make sure everybody plays by the rules, but it is a
limited role.  Nobody ever went to a ball game to see the umpire.” Confirmation Hearing on the
Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of Judge John G. Roberts, Jr.).  For a
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Likewise, although Senator McCain focused on alleged judicial fail-
ures to respect the popular will in his remarks on judicial philosophy
that were discussed above,80 he also stressed “a series of judicial opin-
ions and edicts wandering farther and farther from the clear meanings
of the Constitution, and from the clear limits of judicial power that the
Constitution defines.”81  McCain wanted “a nominee for the Court
[who] will dare to be faithful to the clear intentions of the framers and
to the actual meaning of the Constitution.”82
More recently, Senator Jeff Sessions of Alabama, the ranking Re-
publican on the Senate Judiciary Committee, has been framing the
issue of appropriate judicial conduct as a matter of fidelity to law, not
as a matter of judicial deference.  According to Sessions, Republicans
“consider activism as a threat to the rule of law.  I use [Utah GOP
Sen. Orrin] Hatch’s definition of activism: a judge who allows their
personal views to override their commitment to the law.”83  Sessions
apparently believes that the judges he approves of follow “the law”
while the judges he disapproves of follow “their personal views.”
The charge that certain judges allow personal views to trump legal-
ity may differ in subtle but important ways from the charge that cer-
tain judges impose their personal views on the public.  The latter
construction—imposing personal views—seems to contemplate a
flight from legality only in the direction of too much intervention.  A
judge who commits legal error by declining to enforce an individual
right does not impose her views on the public.  As far as the judge is
concerned, the public remains free to do what it wishes.  By contrast,
the former construction—allowing personal views to guide deci-
sions—seems to communicate disapproval of departures from law in
the direction of both too much intervention and too little.84  Senator
Sessions himself focused on the need for greater judicial intervention
critique of the umpire analogy, see generally Neil S. Siegel, Umpires at Bat: On Integration and
Legitimation, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 701 (2007).  During her Supreme Court confirmation hear-
ing, then-Judge Sotomayor made similar statements. See, e.g., Sotomayor Pledges “Fidelity to
the Law”, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/07/13/sotomayor.hearing/index.html?iref=
hpmostpop (last visited July 15, 2009) (“In the past month, many senators have asked me about
my judicial philosophy . . . .  It is simple: fidelity to the law.  The task of a judge is not to make
the law—it is to apply the law.  And it is clear, I believe, that my record in two courts reflects my
rigorous commitment to interpreting the Constitution according to its terms . . . .”).
80. Remarks by John McCain on Judicial Philosophy, supra note 60.
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. Kirk Victor, Court’s in Session, NAT’L J., May 23, 2009, at 57.
84. Cf. Young, supra note 12, at 1147–48 (identifying as one possible definition of judicial
activism “departures from the constitutional authority—whether it be text, structure, or his-
tory—that legitimated judicial power in the first place”).
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in criticizing then-Judge Sonia Sotomayor.  He singled out her “pri-
vate property decision permit[ing] the government to take property
from one developer and give it to another,” “[h]er 2008 Ricci decision
allow[ing] a city to discriminate against one group of firefighters be-
cause of their race,” and “[h]er 2009 Second Amendment decision
[giving] states the power to ban firearms.”85  This is not how Republi-
can politicians tended to use the term “judicial activism” to criticize
the perceived excesses of the Warren and Burger Courts.
Today, there appear to be two primary ways of understanding the
Republican rhetoric of judicial activism.  First, the charge may be that
judicial activists fail to show proper deference to the will of popular
majorities.  Second, and increasingly at present, the accusation may be
that judicial activists allow their merely personal views, and not the
law, to dictate outcomes in cases.  The quotation with which I began
this inquiry espouses both conceptions of the Republican critique.
“Judicial activism,” the 2008 Republican Platform instructs, “is a grave
threat to the rule of law because unaccountable federal judges are
usurping democracy, ignoring the Constitution and its separation of
powers, and imposing their personal opinions upon the public.”86
Frames of unaccountability, usurpation of democracy, and disrespect
of separation-of-powers limits on judicial authority seem primarily to
condemn judges who fail to accord proper deference to popular ma-
jorities.  Charges of ignoring the Constitution and imposing personal
views seem predominantly to express concern about judges who are
unfaithful to the law.  I now analyze each conception of judicial activ-
ism in turn.
III. JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AS THE FAILURE TO SHOW DEFERENCE
A. Political Practice
To determine whether there is tension between the deference rheto-
ric often employed by Republican politicians and the reality of con-
temporary Republican commitments, it is instructive to consider the
particular judicial decisions that Republican leaders single out for
greatest criticism.  As we saw in Part II, Senator McCain, while
campaigning for president, criticized not only the Court’s intervention
in Roper and the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Newdow, but also the defer-
ence displayed by the Court in Kelo.  He voiced those criticisms imme-
diately after he rebuked judges who “brush off the standards of the
85. Jeff Sessions, A Confirmation Conversion, USA TODAY, July 27, 2009, at 8A.
86. 2008 Republican Party Platform, supra note 1, at 19.
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people themselves and their elected representatives.”87  Likewise,
President George W. Bush, while speaking at a Federalist Society
event near the end of his presidency,88 criticized the Ninth Circuit’s
ruling in Newdow, the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo, and the
Court’s partial invalidation of the Military Commissions Act of 2006
in Boumediene v. Bush.89  By contrast, he expressed approval of the
Court’s rejection of a facial challenge to the federal Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act of 2003 in Gonzales v. Carhart,90 and its invalida-
tion of the District of Columbia’s gun control law in District of Colum-
bia v. Heller.91  Thus, both McCain and Bush criticized the apparent
absence of judicial deference to popular majorities and the apparent
presence of judicial deference to popular majorities.
The 2008 Platform also illustrates contemporary contradictions be-
tween rhetoric and reality.  Immediately after decrying “unaccounta-
ble federal judges” who “are usurping democracy” and stating that
this “[j]udicial activism . . . . must stop,”92 the Platform lists these
objections:
We condemn the Supreme Court’s disregard of homeowners’ prop-
erty rights in its Kelo decision and deplore the Court’s arbitrary ex-
tension of Americans’ habeas corpus rights to enemy combatants
held abroad.  We object to the Court’s unwarranted interference in
the administration of the death penalty in this country for the bene-
fit of savage criminals whose guilt is not at issue.  We lament that
judges have denied the people their right to set abortion policies in
the states and are undermining traditional marriage laws from coast
to coast.  We are astounded that four justices of the Supreme Court
believe that individual Americans have no individual right to bear
arms to protect themselves and their families.93
This bill of particulars condemns both judicial failures to exercise def-
erence (alleged enemy combatants, capital punishment, abortion, and
gay marriage) and judicial failures to protect constitutional rights
(property rights and gun rights).  In a subsequent section entitled
“Preserving Our Values,” the Platform proclaims that “[i]ndividual
rights—and the responsibilities that go with them—are the foundation
of a free society.”94  Among other things, the Platform endorses Sec-
87. Remarks by John McCain on Judicial Philosophy, supra note 60.
88. See Press Release, Office of the White House Press Secretary, President Bush Discusses
Judicial Accomplishments and Philosophy (Oct. 6, 2008), available at http://georgewbush-white
house.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/10/20081006-5.html (last visited June 14, 2009).
89. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
90. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
91. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
92. 2008 Republican Party Platform, supra note 1, at 19.
93. Id. at 19–20.
94. Id. at 51.
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ond Amendment rights, constitutional colorblindness, religious liber-
ties, and property rights.  The Platform further “affirm[s] that the
unborn child has a fundamental individual right to life which cannot
be infringed.”95
The manner in which the 2008 Platform engages the subject of abor-
tion captures nicely the problematic relation between political rheto-
ric and political practice.  The party’s commitment to the idea that a
fetus has a constitutional right to life under Section One of the Four-
teenth Amendment contradicts the Platform’s earlier criticism of the
Court’s abortion jurisprudence—specifically, the “lament that judges
have denied the people their right to set abortion policies in the
states.”96  If the point in dispute were who gets to decide the abortion
issue, then the “right” of “the people”—that is, deference logic—
might carry independent weight.  But the actual point seems to be
how the abortion issue gets decided.  Majoritarian democracy and ju-
dicial deference have little to do with the matter.  “Judicial activism,”
Keith Whittington notes, “apparently now includes decisions such as
those leaving in place the University of Michigan’s race conscious ad-
missions policies and those refraining from interfering with the town
of New London’s redevelopment plans.”97
Notably, in redeclaring the party’s commitment to colorblindness,
the 2008 Platform “affirm[s] the commonsense approach of the Chief
Justice of the United States: that the way to stop discriminating on the
basis of race is to stop discriminating.”98  Only Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Alito endorsed the assertiveness of Chief Justice Roberts
in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District
95. Id. at 52–54.
96. Id. at 20.
97. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE PRESI-
DENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 283–84 (Ira
Katznelson et al. eds., 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The New York Times noted,
Since President Obama nominated Judge Sotomayor for the Supreme Court, a ubiq-
uitous accusation by her critics . . . is that she is a “judicial activist” who legislates from
the bench.
Yet . . . it is far from clear that her judicial record supports the accusation that she is
an activist.  Several empirical studies have concluded that she is not particularly prone
to overriding policy decisions by elected branches.
And her cases that have attracted the most criticism from conservatives—involving a
decision to discard the results of firefighter exams because members of minorities
scored poorly, a controversial property condemnation and a campaign finance law—are
instances in which she deferred to policy decisions by elected branches that conserva-
tives hoped judges would strike down.
Charlie Savage, Uncertain Evidence for “Activist” Label on Sotomayor, N.Y. TIMES, June 20,
2009, at A10.
98. 2008 Republican Party Platform, supra note 1, at 52.
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No. 1.99  Not coincidentally, those four Justices are held in highest re-
gard in contemporary Republican politics.  I now consider the extent
to which they can accurately be described as practitioners of judicial
deference.
B. Judicial Practice
It is uncontroversial to suggest that only Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito belong on the list of current Justices
who are widely esteemed in Republican political circles.  While run-
ning for president in 2000, George W. Bush identified Justices Scalia
and Thomas as models of the kind of judges that he would appoint.100
Moreover, during the 2008 presidential election, there were relatively
clear differences between the two candidates regarding which Justices
they admired most and least.  During the Saddleback Presidential
Candidates Forum, Senator John McCain told Pastor Rick Warren
that he never would have nominated Justices Stevens, Souter, Gins-
burg, and Breyer.  McCain also said that Roberts and Alito were two
of his “most recent favorites,” and that he was “proud of President
Bush for nominating them.”101  Obama, by contrast, told Pastor War-
ren that he would not have nominated Justices Scalia and Thomas,
and that time had already confirmed his ultimate decision to vote
against the confirmation of Chief Justice Roberts.102  Legal commen-
tators often note how Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Alito are perceived in Republican and Democratic polit-
ics.103  I will leave Justice Kennedy aside because there is widespread
disagreement between and among Republicans and Democrats about
99. 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (plurality opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (“The way to stop discrimina-
tion on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”).  For a discussion of the
plurality’s apparently broad rejection of the use of racial criteria to integrate public schools, see
infra notes 153–162 and accompanying text.
100. See Press Release, supra note 89 (“A lot has happened since 2000.  Yet I can still remem-
ber the heated debate over the kinds of judges Presidents should appoint. . . . When asked if I
had any idea in mind of the kind of judges I would appoint, I clearly remember saying, I do.
That would be Judges Scalia and Thomas.”).
101. The interview transcript is available at CNN.com—Transcripts, http://transcripts.cnn.
com/TRANSCRIPTS/0808/17/se.01.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2009). See also Remarks by John
McCain on Judicial Philosophy, supra note 60 (“I have my own standards of judicial ability,
experience, philosophy, and temperament.  And Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito
meet those standards in every respect.  They would serve as the model for my own nominees if
that responsibility falls to me.”); id. (“I will look for people in the cast of John Roberts, Samuel
Alito, and my friend the late William Rehnquist . . . .”).
102. CNN.com—Transcripts, supra note 102.
103. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Turning Sharply to the Right, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 423, 423
(2007); cf. Lori A. Ringhand, Judicial Activism: An Empirical Examination of Voting Behavior
on the Rehnquist Natural Court, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 43, 59 (2007) (“Clearly, the Rehnquist
Court justices generally regarded as the most conservative (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
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how to characterize him.  I will also leave Justice Sotomayor aside be-
cause she recently joined the Court.
Framed precisely, then, the question I shall examine is whether it is
true as a general matter that Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Alito are more likely to side with the government than
are Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.104
To be sure, there are important areas of litigation involving the gov-
ernment in which the Court does not divide neatly into the four-Jus-
tice blocks described above.  I am thinking specifically of the Court’s
recent Sixth Amendment revolutions in the areas of the Confronta-
tion Clause105 and criminal sentencing.106  The same could be said of
some Fourth Amendment,107 free speech,108 and free exercise cases,109
as well as cases involving the dormant commerce clause.110  Those de-
cisions produce either splits that are difficult to describe in ideological
terms or near unanimity among the Justices.111  In addition, some-
times individual Justices vote in unexpected ways.112
Nonetheless, it turns out that a striking aspect of the decision-mak-
ing process of this Court is the near-perfect extent to which the Jus-
tices can be grouped into the same blocks in certain divisive cases.
Scalia and Thomas) were far more reticent to invalidate state laws than were their more liberal
counterparts.”).
104. Of course, it is impossible to discern just from voting behavior whether a vote for the
government signifies deference logic or simple substantive agreement with the government’s
position.  I assume that a vote for the government signifies deference.  I make that assumption
not because it is necessarily sound, but because even if one makes that assumption, Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito are still not accurately characterized as practi-
tioners of judicial deference as a general matter.
105. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009); Giles v. California, 128
S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
106. The line of cases beginning with Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), has tended
to implicate differences in methodology—specifically, legalism versus pragmatism—not differ-
ences in ideology. See, e.g., Oregon v. Ice, 129 S. Ct. 711 (2009); United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
107. See, e.g., Virginia v. Moore, 128 S. Ct. 1598 (2008) (9–0 decision).
108. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830 (2008) (7–2 decision).
109. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  In free exercise cases, Justice
Alito may end up agreeing more with Justice Souter than with Justice Scalia. See, e.g.,
Blackhawk v. Pennsylvania, 381 F.3d 202, 204 (3d Cir. 2004); Fraternal Order of Police Newark
Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999).
110. See, e.g., United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S.
330 (2007); Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005).
111. Cases that concern limits on punitive damages, although they do not involve the govern-
ment as a party, also implicate splits that are difficult to describe in ideological terms. See, e.g.,
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008); Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S.
346 (2007).
112. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 698–705 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in the
judgment); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554–79 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Bd. of Educ.
of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 838–42 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring).
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Such cases are well described by Anthony Kronman’s notion of “iden-
tity-defining” conflicts, so named because the choices they require
“define the community that makes them in the same way that some
personal choices define the individual who does.”113  For example,
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito almost
always agree with one another in constitutional litigation involving
government regulation of abortion,114 race and equal protection,115
the meaning and scope of the Second Amendment,116 eligibility for
the death penalty,117 the detention or trial of alleged enemy combat-
ants,118 and the domestic judicial enforceability of international law.119
Likewise, Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer almost al-
ways agree with one another on these issues.  And Justice Kennedy
proves decisive by agreeing with one side or the other.  In cases impli-
cating those profound questions of personal and collective identity,
this 5–4 or 4–1–4 fracture best characterizes the Roberts Court, which
is why it is often called the Kennedy Court.120  It is not merely that the
views of the Justices within each block are positively correlated across
issue areas.  The Justices can, almost without exception,121 be counted
on to agree with the other members of their voting block on all of
those issues.122  As Christopher Eisgruber recently noted with only
modest overstatement, “If you tell me where a justice stands on abor-
tion, I can tell you what that justice’s position is on affirmative action,
113. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFES-
SION 88–89 (1993) (“In the political sphere, as in the personal, there are some choices that have
what I call identity-defining consequences.”).  Kronman notes,
[T]hose controversies that happen at any moment to be the most lively and important
ones in a community—those with the largest implications for its direction and destiny—
often present conflicts among values that reflect incomparable visions of what is most
worthy in the community’s current practices or future possibilities . . . .
Id. at 90.
114. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
115. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
116. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
117. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008).
118. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557
(2006). But see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554 (2004) (Scalia, J., joined by Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
119. See Medellı´n v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331
(2006).
120. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, When It Matters Most, It Is Still the Kennedy Court, 11
GREEN BAG 2D 427 (2008).
121. Medellı´n and Sanchez-Llamas are partial exceptions. See infra note 130.
122. I have not included gay rights and the Establishment Clause in the list compiled in the
text because the Roberts Court has yet to decide a case in either area. But see infra notes
131–136 and accompanying text (discussing the likely views of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito on the subject).
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gun control, criminal procedure, federalism and other privacy
issues.”123
Turning to the jurisprudence, Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito tend to be the most deferential in certain
areas of constitutional and statutory law.  Consider, for example, re-
cent decisions falling under the general heading of access to courts,
including cases that involve standing doctrine124 and filing dead-
lines.125  Consider as well decisions involving government regulation
of abortion,126 eligibility for the death penalty,127 criminal cases gener-
ally,128 the detention or trial of alleged enemy combatants,129 and the
domestic judicial enforceability of international law.130  In those areas,
Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito are accurately characterized as ju-
rists who tend to reject claims of individual rights against the govern-
ment, while Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer are
accurately described as Justices who hold the opposite view.131
123. Adam Liptak, To Nudge, Shift, or Shove the Court Left, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2009, at
WK4.  Professor Eisgruber also noted the “surprising amount of ideological coherence on the
court over the last 30 years.” Id.
124. See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587 (2007); Massachusetts v. EPA,
549 U.S. 497 (2007).
125. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007); cf. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
550 U.S. 618 (2007) (corporate defendant).
126. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
127. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008); cf. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551
(2005) (death penalty decision of the Rehnquist Court); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)
(same).
128. See Ward Farnsworth, Signatures of Ideology: The Case of the Supreme Court’s Criminal
Docket, 104 MICH. L. REV. 67, 69 chart 1 (2005) (demonstrating empirically a huge difference in
the frequency with which the Justices have voted for the government in non-unanimous criminal
cases since 1953).
129. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557
(2006). But see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554 (2004) (Scalia, J., joined by Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
130. See Medellı´n v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331
(2006). Medellı´n and Sanchez-Llamas are partial exceptions.  In Medellı´n, Justice Stevens con-
curred in the judgment, expressing great sympathy for the dissenting views of Justices Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer but voting on the same side as the other group of four. See 128 S. Ct. at
1372.  In Sanchez-Llamas, Justice Ginsburg concurred in the judgment, joining only part of Jus-
tice Breyer’s dissenting opinion, which Justices Stevens and Souter joined in full. See 548 U.S. at
360.
131. The end of the October 2008 Term offered further illustrations. See Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (dividing 5–4 over whether due process required recusal
of a state supreme court justice who received extraordinarily large campaign contributions from
one of the litigants in a case before him); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (dividing 5–4
over the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 in a damages suit against
present and former high-ranking federal officials); Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009)
(dividing 5–4 over the applicability of the exclusionary rule in the context of negligent mistakes
by police); Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009)
(dividing 5–4 over whether a prisoner is constitutionally entitled to test DNA evidence post-
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Controversies falling under the general heading of gay rights or the
separation of church and state should also be included on any list of
divisive conflicts that are likely to fracture the Court into identifiable
camps.  The Roberts Court has yet to render a decision concerning the
extent to which the Constitution protects the equality or liberty of
homosexuals, but it seems unlikely that Chief Justice Roberts and Jus-
tice Alito would have voted with the majority’s articulation of individ-
ual rights in Lawrence v. Texas132 or Romer v. Evans.133  Likewise, the
Roberts Court has yet to render any Establishment Clause decisions,
but it seems doubtful that either Chief Justice Roberts or Justice Alito
would have found a constitutional violation in, say, either Van Orden
v. Perry134 or McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky.135  I recognize
the problem with using recorded votes to look for evidence of judicial
views while using independent judgments about judicial views to pre-
dict votes.  Nonetheless, those predictions seem accurate.136
One should not generalize from the substantial list above, however,
because another substantial list cuts in the opposite direction.  Con-
sider First Amendment challenges to campaign finance legislation,137
Second Amendment challenges to gun control laws,138 Takings Clause
conviction).  In each of those cases, Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito
voted in favor of the position of the government or government officials.
132. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
133. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
134. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
135. 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
136. Cf., e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587 (2007) (fracturing 5–4
along familiar ideological lines over whether taxpayers have standing to assert an Establishment
Clause claim against Executive Branch actions funded by general appropriations, as opposed to
a specific congressional grant).  Gay rights may be a closer question.  Roberts, for example,
offered pro bono legal advice to the gay-rights advocates in Romer. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg &
David D. Kirkpatrick, Court Nominee Advised Group on Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2005,
at A1.
137. See, e.g., Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008); Fed. Election Comm’n v.
Wisc. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007); see also Eugene Volokh, How the Justices Voted in
Free Speech Cases, 1994–2000, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1191, 1198 (2001) (“[W]e can no longer assume
that the Left generally sides with speakers and the Right with the government. . . .   Many of the
strongest libertarian voices in favor of free speech rights and against government power now
come from conservatives at least as much as from liberals.”).  Accordingly, it is not clear why
political scientists code a vote in favor of a First Amendment claim as “liberal” and a vote
against as “conservative.” See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and
the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557, 559 (1989) (“Liberal state-
ments include . . . those ascribing support for . . . the individual against the government in . . .
First Amendment cases.”).  That problem has been recognized and rectified by legal scholarship
that uses some of the methods of modern political science. See Ringhand, supra note 103, at
56–57; Lori A. Ringhand, The Rehnquist Court: A “By-the-Numbers” Retrospective, 9 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1033, 1041–42 (2007).
138. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
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challenges to assertions of the power of eminent domain,139 equal pro-
tection challenges to the use of affirmative action in various set-
tings,140 equal protection challenges to race-conscious student
assignment plans,141 challenges to the permissible scope of federal
laws aimed at protecting the environment,142 and all of the ways in
which the Rehnquist Court restricted congressional power in the
name of federalism.143  In litigation involving those issues, Chief Jus-
tice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito are characteristi-
cally solicitous of the interests of individual claimants who contest
government action.144 District of Columbia v. Heller exactly exempli-
139. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
140. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (law school admissions); Gratz v. Bol-
linger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (university admissions); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200 (1995) (government contracting).  Those decisions, as well as Kelo, came down before Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito joined the Court.  One can object on that ground to my inclu-
sion of those decisions, but the strength of such an objection would turn on the likelihood that
either Roberts or Alito would have voted differently from Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia and Thomas in any of those cases.  I have included those decisions because I find such a
scenario unlikely. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 748 (2007) (plurality opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (“The way to stop discrimination on the basis
of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”); Adam Liptak, Issue of Property Rights Is
Likely to Arise in Sotomayor’s Confirmation Hearings, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2009, at A13
(“Without quite saying Kelo had been incorrectly decided, both [Roberts and Alito], at the time
federal appeals court judges, spoke at length [during their confirmation hearings] about their
doubts concerning its wisdom and consequences.”).
141. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).  For
reasons that I have identified elsewhere, race-conscious student assignment plans are not prop-
erly described as affirmative action programs. See Neil S. Siegel, Race-Conscious Student As-
signment Plans: Balkanization, Integration, and Individualized Consideration, 56 DUKE L.J. 781,
835–38 (2006).
142. See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
143. The Court restricted federal power under the Commerce Clause, the Tenth Amendment,
the Eleventh Amendment, and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Those cases were
decided before Roberts and Alito joined the Court, but there is every reason to believe that they
agree with the judicially enforced limits on federal power that the Rehnquist Court imposed.
For a discussion and case citations, see Neil S. Siegel, Dole’s Future: A Strategic Analysis, 16 SUP.
CT. ECON. REV. 165 (2008).
144. For an illustration from the end of the October 2008 Term, see Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S.
Ct. 2658 (2009) (dividing 5–4 over whether a city violated Title VII by discarding the results of
an exam used to identify firefighters best qualified to fill vacant lieutenant and captain positions
when the results of the exam showed that white candidates had significantly outperformed mi-
nority candidates).  Moreover, in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District v. Holder, 129 S. Ct.
2504, 2516–17 (2009), the Court held 8–1 that a small utility district in Texas was eligible to seek
relief from the preclearance obligations of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 under the
“bailout” provision of the statute.  129 S. Ct. at 2516–17.  The Court thereby avoided deciding
the constitutionality of Congress’s twenty-five-year extension of § 5 in 2006.  It is almost cer-
tainly the case, however, that a decision on the constitutional question would have generated—
and may yet generate—a 5–4 ideological split.  The Court sent the message that a majority of
Justices view § 5 as unconstitutional and that Congress is now on the clock to redraft the statute
before the Court strikes it down. See Posting of Tom Goldstein to SCOTUSblog, http://www.
scotusblog.com/wp/analysis-supreme-court-invalidates-section-5’s-coverage-scheme-2/ (June 22,
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fies that point.  In Heller, the Court struck down the District’s gun
control statute, declaring for the first time in American history that
the Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a fire-
arm, including a handgun, in the home for purposes of self-defense.145
The case of the Second Amendment is worth considering more
closely.  Despite concerted efforts by gun rights advocates to change
the authoritative meaning of the Second Amendment in the decades
after Brown v. Board of Education,146 Chief Justice Burger stated in
1991 that the individual-rights view of the Second Amendment was
“the subject of one of the greatest pieces of fraud, I repeat the word
‘fraud,’ on the American public by special interest groups that I have
ever seen in my lifetime.”147  Similarly, former Solicitor General Er-
win Griswold opined in 1990 that “to assert that the Constitution is a
barrier to reasonable gun laws, in the face of the unanimous judgment
of the federal courts to the contrary, exceeds the limits of principled
advocacy.”148  And Judge Bork stated in 1989 that the Amendment
“guarantee[s] the right of states to form militia, not for individuals to
bear arms.”149  He adjudged state gun control legislation “probably
constitutional.”150
Yet two decades later, the Roberts Court decided Heller and the
Court fractured ideologically.  Something obviously changed to make
many Republican jurists more receptive to the National Rifle Associa-
tion’s view of the Second Amendment.  Reva Siegel offers a convinc-
2009, 13:13 EST) (“Though the Supreme Court by a wide margin today formally declined to
resolve a challenge to the constitutionality of Section 5, the reality is far different.  The decision
unambiguously served notice that the Justices are prepared to invalidate the statute as it
stands.”).  In addition, the Court heard reargument in Citizens United v. FEC, No. 08-205, on
September 9, 2009, after directing the parties “to file supplemental briefs addressing” whether
“the Court [should] overrule either or both Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S.
652 (1990), and the part of McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), which addresses the facial
validity of Section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C. § 441b.”  Order
in Pending Case, No. 08-25 (June 29, 2009), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/
courtorders/062909zr.pdf.  The Court could have chosen to decide the case on far narrower
grounds.  Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito appeared
poised to overrule precedent and hold that a key provision of federal campaign finance law
violates the First Amendment.  On January 21, 2010, as this Article was going to press, those five
Justices did just that. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
145. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (holding that the Second Amend-
ment protects an individual right to possess a firearm—including a handgun—unconnected with
service in a militia, and to use that firearm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense
within the home).
146. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
147. Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism As Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122
HARV. L. REV. 191, 224 (2008) (citation omitted).
148. Id. (citation omitted).
149. Id.
150. Id.
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ing account of the causal processes that were at work in the interim.
She “situates originalism’s claim to ground judicial decisionmaking
outside of politics in the constitutional politics of the late twentieth
century, and demonstrates how Heller respects claims and com-
promises forged in social movement conflict over the right to bear
arms in the decades after Brown.”151  Current Republican rhetoric
that the judges they favor respect the will of the people seems to pre-
suppose that this history never happened.  Such rhetoric incorrectly
implies that courts, not legislatures, remain the central object of criti-
cism of the Republican Party.152
Similar to Heller in this regard is Parents Involved, the consolidated
cases in which families with children in the public school systems of
Seattle, Washington and Louisville, Kentucky brought an equal pro-
tection challenge to the school districts’ use of racial criteria in student
assignment plans aimed at promoting racial integration.  The plaintiffs
in the Seattle case supported their claim to constitutional attention by
stressing the “plight of two families” as illustrative of “the conse-
quences of the District’s racial classification scheme for many families
in Seattle.”153  “Both children,” the petitioners explained, “were de-
nied admission” to their first choice of high school “because they were
white and consequently were not allowed to enroll in the biotech pro-
gram” that was “unique” to the school.154
151. Siegel, supra note 148, at 192–93.  Reva Siegel explains,
Exploring this social movement history, we learn how, in the wake of Brown, citizens
made claims on a Second Amendment concerned with law and order and self-defense;
how, during the 1980s, a growing coalition of citizens came to assert their convictions
about the Second Amendment as the original understanding; and why, by the 1990s,
proponents of this law-and-order Second Amendment came to differentiate their
claims from those of the modern militia movement, emphasizing that the Second
Amendment entitled the citizen to arms needed to defend his family against crime, not
against the government.
Id. at 194.
152. Professor Siegel captures the tension that many Republican jurists perceived circa 1990:
In The Constitution in the Year 2000, originalism advanced the “social issues” agenda of
the New Right by delegitimating rights recognized by the Warren and Burger Courts;
orginalism was a tool for criticizing courts, not for challenging legislatures.  By contrast,
the individual rights claim on the Second Amendment was a New Right right, at odds
with judicial precedent and in tension with New Right complaints about judicial activ-
ism.  Its recognition would require a federal bench prepared to advance original under-
standing as a reason for invalidating legislative action.
At the end of the 1980s, the bench and bar still did not see the Second Amendment
as authorizing judicial intervention of that kind.
Id. at 224.
153. Petitioner’s Brief at 7, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701 (2007) (No. 05-908).
154. Id. at 7–8.
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As noted above, that constitutional attack attracted sufficient sup-
port among the Justices to prevail.155  In a majority opinion joined by
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, Chief Justice Roberts
wrote at length about the problems facing young Joshua McDonald, a
student in the Louisville school system.  “When petitioner Crystal
Meredith moved into the school district in August 2002,” Roberts ex-
plained, “she sought to enroll her son . . . in kindergarten for the
2002–2003 school year.  His resides school was only a mile from his
new home, but it had no available space.”156  Roberts further ex-
plained that the school district assigned Joshua to another school that
was ten miles from their home, and Meredith sought to transfer him to
the school that was one mile from home.157  Although “[s]pace was
available,” Roberts noted that “Joshua’s transfer was nonetheless de-
nied because . . . ‘[t]he transfer would have an adverse effect on deseg-
regation compliance.’”158  Later, in a part of his opinion that Justice
Kennedy declined to join, the Chief Justice concluded that “the school
districts have not carried their burden of showing that the ends they
seek justify the particular extreme means they have chosen—classify-
ing individual students on the basis of their race and discriminating
among them on that basis.”159 Parents Involved illustrates that some-
times the Justices most admired in Republican politics empathize160
with “poor Joshua.”161  Sometimes they are the most eager to trump
155. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
156. Id. at 717.
157. Id. (citation omitted).
158. Id. (citation omitted); see also id. at 728 (plurality opinion) (“Joshua McDonald’s re-
quested transfer was denied because his race was listed as ‘other’ rather than black, and allowing
the transfer would have had an adverse effect on the racial guideline compliance of Young Ele-
mentary, the school he sought to leave.” (citation omitted)).
159. Id. at 745 (plurality opinion).
160. See, e.g., Ramesh Ponnuru, Op-Ed., When Judicial Activism Suits the Right, N.Y. TIMES,
June 24, 2009, at A29 (“Conservatives are moved, as well, by their empathy for the Frank Riccis
of the world.  When President Obama has talked about empathy on the bench, conservatives
have responded that, given free rein, it can lead judicial reasoning astray.  On race, unfortu-
nately, we are illustrating our own point.”).
161. I am referring, of course, to these famous words authored by Justice Blackmun:
Poor Joshua!  Victim of repeated attacks by an irresponsible, bullying, cowardly, and
intemperate father, and abandoned by respondents who placed him in a dangerous
predicament and who knew or learned what was going on, and yet did essentially noth-
ing except, as the Court revealingly observes . . . , “dutifully recorded these incidents in
[their] files.”  It is a sad commentary upon American life, and constitutional princi-
ples—so full of late of patriotic fervor and proud proclamations about “liberty and
justice for all”—that this child, Joshua DeShaney, now is assigned to live out the re-
mainder of his life profoundly retarded.  Joshua and his mother, as petitioners here,
deserve—but now are denied by this Court—the opportunity to have the facts of their
case considered in the light of the constitutional protection that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is
meant to provide.
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legislative majorities, even despite longstanding opposition—framed
in the language of judicial deference—to court-ordered racial
integration.162
I am not endeavoring to be exhaustive in my case citations or dis-
cussions of different areas of law.  Nor, obviously, am I attempting to
employ quantitative techniques and ensure a representative sample,
which presents its own promises and problems, and in any event, is
unnecessary for my purposes.163  But I cannot fairly be charged with
cherry picking cases or doctrinal categories that support my general
points.  One commentator who does not share my constitutional com-
mitments has come to a similar conclusion, rejecting “the widespread
myth that the defining difference between liberal and conservative
justices is that the former support ‘individual rights’ and ‘civil liber-
ties,’ while the latter routinely defer to government assertions of au-
thority.”164  Moreover, empirical studies have generated similar
results.165
There are numerous and significant instances in which Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito use the power of judi-
cial review to protect individual rights or to invalidate federal laws in
the name of federalism, and in which Justices Stevens, Souter, Gins-
burg, and Breyer do not.  To reiterate, the former group of Justices
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 213 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted).
162. See, e.g., supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text (discussing Richard Nixon’s stated
reason for opposing busing pursuant to desegregation decrees); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S.
717, 741–42 (1974) (“No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local
control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential both to
the maintenance of community concern and support for public schools and to quality of the
educational process” (citation omitted)).  For a discussion of the deference logic that used to be
employed to limit school desegregation, see Siegel, supra note 141, at 824–25, 841–43.
163. I particularly want to avoid the problem of according the same weight to each decision of
the Court.  It makes scant sense to “count” a Parents Involved, a Heller, or a Carhart as worth
the same as any other decision of the Court.
164. David E. Bernstein, Liberals, Conservatives, and Individual Rights, CATO, June 27, 2008,
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=9511; see id. (“There are many ideological differ-
ences between the conservative and liberal justices on the Supreme Court.  But a consistent,
stronger liberal devotion to supporting individual rights and civil liberties against assertions of
government power isn’t one of them.”).  Professor Bernstein does not appear to register the
extent to which Republican political rhetoric is responsible for the myth that he correctly rejects.
165. Professor Ringhand summarizes the results of one of her careful studies:
[T]he interesting difference between the Court’s “liberal” and “conservative” justices is
not whether they used their power of judicial review “actively” but how they used that
power.  Liberal justices used the power of judicial review to protect certain First
Amendment rights, certain civil rights, and the rights of criminal defendants; conserva-
tive justices used the same power to protect other First Amendment rights, other civil
rights, and states’ rights.
Ringhand, supra note 103, at 45–46 (footnote omitted).
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has, among other things, rejected congressional efforts to regulate the
influence of individual or corporate wealth on the political process,
breathed new doctrinal life into the Second Amendment, and insisted
on near or total colorblindness in race cases no matter what the pur-
poses, effects, or dominant social meanings of the classifications at is-
sue.166  It seems difficult to sustain the notion that, as a general
matter, those four Justices typically defer to the government or tend
to have a limited view of the role of courts in vindicating individual
rights.167  As Thomas Keck concludes in his study, “Contemporary ju-
dicial conservatism is a rights-based conservatism,”168 and yet “we still
tend to associate judicial restraint arguments with conservatives.”169
In substantial part, this may be because “constitutional conservatives
continue to emphasize the long-standing critique of ‘government by
judiciary,’” even though “their primary concern is more often with
liberalism than with judicial power.”170
The key question, in other words, is not why one group of justices
characteristically defers to the government while the other does
not.171  Rather, the question is why each practices judicial deference
when it does.  That is, supporters of each group bear the burden of
justifying which individual rights it would protect and which limits on
federal power it would impose.  Republicans and Democrats alike
must confront that question.  But after decades of Republican rhetoric
about the need for judicial deference to legislative majorities, Repub-
licans may face difficulties, or at least a degree of awkwardness, in
defending rulings against the government that liberals do not face.172
166. But see Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 524–50 (2005) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia,
J., dissenting) (deferring to a state policy of routinely segregating prisoners based on their race).
167. See, e.g., Ponnuru, supra note 160 (“Judicial restraint has also been absent [in the opin-
ions of the conservative Justices in affirmative action cases].”).
168. KECK, supra note 13, at 286.
169. Id. at 288.
170. Id. at 289.
171. Other scholars have documented the existence of distinct kinds of judicial deference—
namely, deference to Congress versus deference to state and local governments.  On the Rehn-
quist Court, “[a]lthough the liberal justices invalidated more state laws than did the conservative
justices, the conservatives were much more willing to invalidate federal laws and to overturn
precedents than were their liberal counterparts.”  Ringhand, supra note 103, at 67; see Paul
Gewirtz & Chad Golder, Op-Ed., So Who Are the Activists?, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2005, at A19.
As Professor Ringhand suggests in the above quotation, one could also define judicial deference
or assertiveness in terms of attitudes toward stare decisis.  I do not explore the question of fidel-
ity to precedent here because Republican politicians have not emphasized the issue.
172. Judge Posner provocatively writes,
The true springs of the Heller decision must be sought elsewhere than in the majority’s
declared commitment to originalism.  The idea behind the decision—it is not articu-
lated, of course, and perhaps not even consciously held—may simply be that turnabout
is fair play.  Liberal judges have used loose construction to expand constitutional
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Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson’s robust and controversial criticism of Hel-
ler registers the problem in a refreshingly candid way.173  By contrast,
in a recent public interview at Duke Law School, Justice Scalia
seemed to revel in the frequency with which he deems himself re-
quired to declare government action “stupid but constitutional.”174
He did not mention how often he has felt obliged to declare govern-
ment action “sensible but unconstitutional.”  One might call this “the
Heller problem” for practitioners of the rhetoric of judicial activism.175
prohibitions beyond any responsible construal of original meaning; and now it is the
conservatives’ turn.
See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness: The Supreme Court and Gun Control,
NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 32, 33.
173. See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA.
L. REV. 253, 254 (2009) (“Heller encourages Americans to do what conservative jurists warned
for years they should not do: bypass the ballot and seek to press their political agenda in the
courts.”).  The title of one response to Wilkinson conveys just how threatening his view of Heller
is perceived to be in certain circles. See Nelson Lund & David B. Kopel, Unraveling Judicial
Restraint: Guns, Abortion, and the Faux Conservatism of J. Harvie Wilkinson, III (George Mason
Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 08-61, 2008), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1309714.
174. See Justice Antonin Scalia, A Life in the Law: Remarks at Duke University School of
Law (Jan. 29, 2009) (partial transcript), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/news/story?id=2952
&u=11.  I do not doubt that Justice Scalia sometimes votes against his personal values, as in
certain criminal cases. See, e.g., supra notes 105–106 and accompanying text (referring to recent
Confrontation Clause and sentencing cases).  But on the most divisive issues, the ones that he
and others care about most (such as abortion regulations, criminal prohibitions on homosexual
sex, bans on gay marriage, capital punishment, the government’s prosecution of the war on ter-
ror, and public support for religion or endorsement of religion), it does not appear that he views
the underlying policies as stupid at all.  In Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), for example,
Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion, but Scalia conspicuously declined to
join Thomas’s declaration that “the law before the Court today ‘is . . . uncommonly silly.’” Id. at
605 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965) (Stewart,
J., dissenting)).
175. Justice Scalia is a frequent and voluble practitioner of the rhetoric of judicial activism in
cases in which he opposes a particular exercise of judicial power.  In Lawrence v. Texas, he
stated,
[T]he Court has taken sides in the culture war, departing from its role of assuring, as
neutral observer, that the democratic rules of engagement are observed. . . .  What
Texas has chosen to do is well within the range of traditional democratic action, and its
hand should not be stayed through the invention of a brand-new “constitutional right”
by a Court that is impatient of democratic change.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602–03 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  In Romer v. Evans, he
wrote,
Since the Constitution of the United States says nothing about this subject, it is left to
be resolved by normal democratic means . . . .  This Court has no business imposing
upon all Americans the resolution favored by the elite class from which the Members
of this institution are selected, pronouncing that “animosity” toward homosexuality is
evil.
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see also
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The virtue of a demo-
cratic system . . . is destroyed if the smug assurances of each age are removed from the demo-
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C. Deference: Substantial but Not Strict
One possible objection to my analysis is that I have misdescribed
the Republican critique of judicial activism, so that I have dismantled
a straw man of my own creation.  After all, Republican politicians
have never advocated strict judicial deference in the tradition of James
Bradley Thayer.176  At best, it might be suggested, I have been using
an imperfect proxy for the sort of failure to defer that warrants the
Republican charge of judicial activism—a proxy that renders the phe-
nomenon more empirically tractable at the cost of distorting the phe-
nomenon itself.177  Few today argue that a decision striking down a
law is activist by simple virtue of the fact of invalidation.  For example,
almost no one criticizes Brown as activist, at least not anymore.178
More charitably construed, then, perhaps the Republican rhetoric of
judicial activism condemns judges who fail to show real and substan-
tial deference, although (of course) not strict judicial deference.  Spe-
cratic process and written into the Constitution.”).  Justice Scalia also appealed to democratic
values in Planned Parenthood v. Casey:
[B]y foreclosing all democratic outlet for the deep passions this issue arouses, by ban-
ishing the issue from the political forum that gives all participants, even the losers, the
satisfaction of a fair hearing and an honest fight, by continuing the imposition of a rigid
national rule instead of allowing for regional differences, the Court merely prolongs
and intensifies the anguish.
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1002 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
176. See James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitu-
tional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 129–30 (1893).
177. For example, Frank Cross and Stefanie Lindquist write,
A commonly invoked measure of judicial activism is the Court’s willingness to invali-
date statutes.  While this is not a perfect or complete measure of activism, it surely has
a rough accuracy, because striking down legislation is a clear flexing of judicial power at
the expense of another branch of government.  Richard Posner has suggested that he
would like to see this metric for activism become “canonical,” because it involves
courts “acting contrary to the will of the other branches of government.”  Ernest Young
concedes that these are the “most dramatic instances” of judicial activism.  Most of the
past decisions cited as “activist” involved the invalidation of a statute, whether it be an
anti-abortion law in Roe or the Violence Against Women Act in Morrison.  In addition,
this measure has the advantages of being ideologically neutral and readily quantifiable
and has been used as a proxy in other research.
Frank B. Cross & Stefanie Lindquist, The Decisional Significance of the Chief Justice, 154 U. PA.
L. REV. 1665, 1701–02 (2006) (footnotes omitted); see also, e.g., Green, supra note 2, at 1218
(“[T]he definition of ‘judicial activism’ as any decision invalidating a statute is popular among
quantitative empiricists, largely because such activity is easy to count.  In modern times, this
definition appears everywhere from political science journals to law reviews to the New York
Times.” (footnotes omitted)).
178. For example, Craig Green writes,
[A] focus on examples of judicial review fails to condemn judicial activism, because a
key function of post-Marbury courts is to invalidate unconstitutional acts. . . .  [M]odern
analysts find nothing more obvious about activism than that it is bad.  If activism meant
any statutory overrule, then such antipathy would be largely misplaced.
Green, supra note 2, at 1219 (footnote omitted)).
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cifically, perhaps Republican politicians have insisted on judicial
deference when government is not clearly violating the Constitu-
tion.179  That formulation allows room for deference as an indepen-
dent constitutional value, but not so much room as to swallow the
institution of judicial review.
Insisting on substantial but not strict deference, however, does not
fill the hole separating Republican rhetoric from Republican practice.
For one thing, it is not at all clear that a commitment to judicial defer-
ence has much to do with why Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito side with the government when they do.180
It is not as if they are likely to be personally or politically opposed to,
say, restrictive regulations on abortion, governmental displays of relig-
ion, capital punishment, and aggressive prosecution of the war on ter-
ror.  Nor is it likely that they personally or politically approve of
aggressive gun control measures, economic development takings, re-
strictive campaign finance laws, and affirmative action programs.  For
another thing, Republican politicians are almost certainly incorrect
that there were clear violations of the Constitution in cases such as
Heller, Kelo, Grutter, Gratz, Parents Involved, and several recent cam-
paign finance cases, as well as numerous federalism cases in which the
Rehnquist Court invalidated acts of Congress.  If the violations were
“clear,” why did the Court split 5–4 in most of those cases?  Moreo-
ver, if the violations were clear, why did constitutional text, original
meaning, and precedent play a limited or nonexistent role in many of
them?181  To consider one example, calling the outcome in Heller
179. See, e.g., Ponnuru, supra note 160 (“Judicial restraint . . . is best understood as a finger on
the scales, tipping judges in close cases against invalidating the actions of Congress or state or
local governments.  To invalidate laws without a strong argument that the Constitution requires
doing so is precisely what conservatives usually mean by ‘judicial activism.’”).
180. See supra note 104 (distinguishing a vote for the government from a principled commit-
ment to judicial deference as an independent constitutional value).
181. Notably, Republican politicians and activists have tended to avoid criticizing Justices
Scalia and Thomas for reasoning in ways that are methodologically suspect from their own juris-
prudential points of view.  I note four examples.  First, they do not purport to follow the original
meaning of the First Amendment in free speech cases. See, e.g., Ringhand, supra note 103, at
52–54 (“[O]f the nine First Amendment cases in which Justice Thomas voted to invalidate a
federal law and Justice Breyer (the justice with the fewest federal invalidation votes) did not,
three involved campaign finance regulation, three involved commercial speech and one involved
the Federal Communication Carriers ‘must carry’ rules for broadcasters—areas not readily im-
plicated under an originalist understanding of the First Amendment.” (footnotes omitted)).  Sec-
ond, they ignore the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment (and Fifth Amendment) in
race cases. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 92 (2009)
(arguing that the basis for Scalia’s and Thomas’s colorblindness “assertions was and is mysteri-
ous—at least for an announced (and proselytizing) Originalist.  Not only does the constitutional
text say no such thing . . . but the best evidence of the original intentions is that the framers did
not intend to constitutionalize a principle of strict colorblindness.” (footnotes omitted)).  Third,
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“clearly” correct, as opposed to merely correct on balance, requires
one to explain why the Court and many federal judges got the Second
Amendment “clearly” wrong from 1791 until 2008.182  That is no small
task.
As the requirement of clear error vanishes from the definition of
judicial activism, the definition itself collapses into another possible
way of understanding deference rhetoric.  Perhaps Republican politi-
cians have simply been insisting on judicial deference when, but only
when, government is not violating the Constitution.183  To champion
deference when government is not violating the Constitution, how-
ever, is not to champion deference at all; it is merely to want judges
who interpret the Constitution correctly, as opposed to incorrectly.  In
other words, Republican deference rhetoric then reduces to the asser-
tion that Republicans possess a substantive constitutional vision and
want judges to express that vision.  That is entirely appropriate; they
are entitled to their own constitutional commitments.  But when they
call what they want “judicial deference,” “judicial restraint,” or “re-
spect for popular majorities,” and when they call deviations from what
they want “judicial activism,” “government by judiciary,” or “judicial
usurpation”—when they attack judges in the terms that they do—they
are hiding their commitments behind what appears to be a general
point about restraint, deference, or judicial role.  The packaging is
deceptive.  It masks substance in process.
they employed nonoriginalist and nontextualist reasoning in Heller. See Siegel, supra note 138,
at 193 (“It is, to say the least, striking that an originalist interpretation of the Second Amend-
ment would treat civic republican understandings of the amendment as antiquated, and refuse to
protect the arms a militia needs to defend against tyranny.”).  Fourth, they are not bound by the
text and original understanding of the Eleventh Amendment in state sovereign immunity cases.
See, e.g., Posting of Ernest A. Young to http://www.acslaw.org/node/13546 (June 9, 2009, 12:07
EST) (noting that, in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), “Justice Souter’s eighty-five-
page dissent conclusively demonstrated that this immunity is inconsistent not only with the text
of the Eleventh Amendment but also with the Founding Generation’s understanding of sover-
eignty.”).  Instead, Scalia and Thomas are more likely to be criticized for their entirely princi-
pled—although not necessarily correct—opposition to substantive due process limits on large
punitive damage awards. See, e.g., Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 361–62 (2007)
(Thomas, J., dissenting); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003)
(Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 598 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (1996).  Moreover, Justice Scalia is criticized for voting to protect flag burning under
the First Amendment and for rejecting presidential power to indefinitely detain U.S. citizens on
U.S. soil as enemy combatants absent suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. See Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 398–99 (1989); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
182. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
183. See, e.g., CASS SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS
ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA 42 (2005) (“When people criticize judges as activist, they mean just
this: The court is not following the right understanding of the Constitution.  To label a decision
‘activist’ is to label it wrong.”).
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IV. JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AS LEGAL INFIDELITY
So perhaps the rhetoric of judicial activism is best understood as
having little to do with judicial deference.  Perhaps Senator Sessions
has captured the best current understanding of this rhetoric.  As noted
in Part II, Sessions (following Senator Hatch) has been asserting that
a judicial activist is “a judge who allows their personal views to over-
ride their commitment to the law.”184
Identifying the Sessions definition of judicial activism, rather than
some notion of judicial deference, as key to Republican criticism of
judges has the obvious advantage of not requiring Republican politi-
cians to give up anything.  Simply asserting, as President George W.
Bush did, that “the Constitution means what it says,” and equating
“what it says” with what Republican politicians say it says, allows
them to denounce both a Roe and a Kelo as “activist” without any
sense of internal inconsistency.  Likewise, it allows them to praise
both a Carhart and a Heller (or a Parents Involved) as the antithesis of
“activist,” again without any sense of contradiction.
Despite the political utility of (re)defining judicial activists as judges
“who allow[ ] their personal views to override their commitment to
the law,”185 the move encounters problems.  First, it appears to consti-
tute a shift away from the primary definition of activism that was long
used in Republican Party platforms and presidential campaign rheto-
ric, which, as documented in Part II, decried judicial interference with
the political process.  That shift may explain why certain prominent
and veteran Republican judges reacted to Heller with incredulity.186
With so much water under the bridge, switching definitions now seems
to require an explanation to dispel the appearance of opportunism.
Either respect for the popular will is highly relevant to the discharge
of a judge’s responsibilities, or respect for the popular will is not par-
ticularly relevant.  Selective criticism, both at a given time and over
time, leaves the impression that respect for popular majorities is in-
voked only when government action should be upheld for other rea-
sons, or only when the Democratic Party controls the federal
judiciary.187
184. Victor, supra note 84, at 37.
185. Id.
186. See generally Wilkinson, supra note 173 and accompanying text; Posner, supra note 172
and accompanying text (discussing the Heller decision).
187. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 343–346 (observing that over the past decade or so
“a surprising number of conservatives suggested that giving up on the idea of restraint altogether
might be best for the cause,” while “[o]ther conservatives simply adopted a new definition of
judicial activism”).
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Second, and more fundamentally, the asserted antinomy between
“personal views” and “the law” presupposes an unsustainably sharp
distinction between constitutional politics and constitutional law, par-
ticularly concerning the work of the Supreme Court of the United
States.  It presupposes that the “the law” to which the justices are
bound is fixed in advance and awaits mere discovery and application
by the jurist, so that a justice can simply put aside “personal views”
and apply “the law.”  But of course that is often not true of the rela-
tionship between justices (or anyone else) and the Constitution of the
United States.  It is widely recognized that the language of the Consti-
tution is often underdeterminate and that various traditional sources
of law often do not add up to a clear answer.188  Robert Bork made
this point more than forty years ago.189
It is noteworthy to observe in this setting that there appears to be
little discernible difference between “personal views” and views of
“the law” among the very people who insist on a strict distinction be-
tween the two when identifying bad judicial behavior.  That much is
188. For a discussion of the underdeterminacy problem in constitutional adjudication, see gen-
erally, for example, Siegel, supra note 79. Cf. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 74 (1962) (“Judges and lawyers recur-
rently come to feel that they find law rather than make it.  Many otherwise painful problems
seem to solve themselves with ease when this feeling envelops people.”).
189. Bork wrote,
[I]t is naive to suppose that the Court’s present difficulties could be cured by ap-
pointing Justices determined to give the Constitution its “true meaning,” to work at
“finding the law” instead of reforming society.  The possibility implied by those com-
forting phrases does not exist.  Every thoughtful working lawyer has shared the insight
expressed by Willy Stark, the Huey Long-like politician in All the King’s Men and a
legal realist if ever there was one.  The law, he said, “is like a single-bed blanket on a
double bed and three folks in the bed and a cold night.  There ain’t ever enough blan-
ket to cover the case, no matter how much pulling and hauling . . . .”
The question, then, is not whether courts should make law, but how and from what
materials. . . .
. . . .
The primary traditional sources of constitutional law—the materials that courts, law-
yers, and scholars usually cite to one another, and that laymen imagine do or should
dictate results—are the text of the Constitution, history, and precedent.  They often set
the outer limits of inquiry, and they sometimes dictate results.  But more often these
sources suggest that the Court must enter a field and yet do not answer the important
questions found there.
Robert H. Bork, The Supreme Court Needs a New Philosophy, FORTUNE, Dec. 1968, at 136,
140–41.  Bork actually omitted the crucial middle ground between purporting to find the Consti-
tution’s “true meaning” on the one hand, and feeling entitled to “reform[ ] society” on the
other.  Cf. Young, supra note 182 (noting “the inevitable reality that traditional legal sources like
text and precedent do not mandate a clear and solitary ‘right answer’ in all cases . . . and that
politics and policy often influence how judges fill in the gap legal indeterminacy creates,” but
insisting that “that sort of realistic appraisal of the limits of legal constraint differs significantly
from the view that judges should forthrightly embrace a policymaking role”).
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evident from the irony of President George W. Bush’s speech before a
highly partisan, adoring audience about the autonomy of law from
contemporary political commitments.190  It is also suggested by the
lack of significant distance in the Republican Party, or the Democratic
Party for that matter, between what members would like the Constitu-
tion to mean regarding abortion, gun rights, gay rights, religion, etc.,
and what each party contends that the Constitution means.  Which
“personal views” do each side give up on those issues in the name of
fidelity to “the law”?  It is the open-endedness of constitutional lan-
guage and the multiplicity of potentially conflicting sources of consti-
tutional meaning that allow each party to fashion a constitution that
substantially reflects the values of its members, at least concerning the
issues that Americans care about most.191
The pervasive and widely perceived reality of ambiguity and disa-
greement partially explains why serious people do not call for the im-
peachment of judges with whom they disagree fundamentally about
what the law is.  If “the law” is as “clear”192 as Senator McCain at
times suggested during his 2008 presidential campaign, then it makes
scant sense for him to count it as a source of pride that he and his
fellow Senate Republicans “didn’t pretend that [Ginsburg’s and
Breyer’s] disagreements with us were a disqualification from office
even though the disagreements were serious and obvious.”193  Why
would a senator who takes his own constitutional obligations seri-
ously—as McCain presumably does—vote to confirm a judicial nomi-
nee who, in the view of the senator, routinely ignores “the law” even
when “the law” is “clear”?  Why vote to confirm, as opposed to im-
peach, a lawless judge?
Lurking in the confirmation practices of the Senate that McCain
described may be an implicit recognition that the law is often not clear
and that contemporary political commitments partially inform the
meaning of the Constitution.194  The 2000 Republican Platform put
the point accurately, even if unwittingly: “We applaud Governor
190. See Press Release, supra note 88.
191. See generally Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959
(2008); Robert C. Post & Neil S. Siegel, Theorizing the Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral Princi-
ples, Affirmative Action, and the Enduring Legacy of Paul Mishkin, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1473 (2007).
I explore in those pieces why the argument in the text is compatible with—indeed, essential to—
the vindication of rule-of-law values.  To reject legal determinacy is not to collapse the distinc-
tion between law and politics.  It is to recognize the political foundations of the rule of law.
192. See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text.
193. Remarks by John McCain on Judicial Philosophy, supra note 60.
194. See id. (“It is part of the discipline of democracy to respect the roles and responsibilities
of each branch of government, and, above all, to respect the verdicts of elections and judgment
of the people.”).
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Bush’s pledge to name only judges who have demonstrated that they
share his conservative beliefs and respect the Constitution.”195  “Con-
servative beliefs” partially define for Republican politicians what it
means to show “respect for the Constitution,” and Republican judges
draw from those beliefs in crafting constitutional law.
Accordingly, with respect to legal views that fall within the range of
reasonable contemporary disagreement, the Hatch/Sessions charge of
“judicial activism” amounts to an epithet for the positions of those
with whom one disagrees in a debate about substantive constitutional
meaning.  If activism concerns whether judges “allow[ ] their personal
views to override their commitment to the law,” then the activism la-
bel merely describes one’s view of what the law is not, amidst poten-
tially robust disagreement about what the law is.196  In that case, it
seems best to retire talk of judicial activism and engage the substan-
tive questions directly.197
The only ways that I perceive to avoid conflating a charge of judicial
activism with substantive disagreement is either to limit the charge to
the uncontroversial set of situations when the law is truly clear, or else
to conduct a motive analysis.  According to the bad-motive interpreta-
tion, judicial activists know what the law is but nonetheless refuse to
follow it because of their “personal views.”  That definition of activ-
ism, however, seems impossible to apply.  How are we to discern what
judges really think the law requires of them?  More importantly, the
definition presumes so much bad faith—indeed, impeachable bad
faith—despite pervasive disagreement that it seems difficult to
credit.198  People who believe that the judges with whom they disagree
disregard what they know to be the law in order to promote a per-
sonal or political agenda may lack sufficient tolerance to be worthy of
consultation in crafting a defensible definition of judicial activism.
195. 2000 Republican Party Platform, supra note 42.
196. To be clear, my focus is on how the “activist” label is used in Republican political dis-
course.  My purpose is not to parse the various potential components of “judicial activism” as a
concept.  For additional conceptions of judicial activism that I do not discuss, see LINDQUIST &
CROSS, supra note 2, at 29–43; Green, supra note 2; William P. Marshall, Conservatives and the
Seven Sins of Judicial Activism, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1217 (2002); Young, supra note 12, at
1143–45.
197. See, e.g., KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: MAKING SENSE OF
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 39 (2006) (“The label ‘activist’ turns out to possess exactly the same
fault it claims to identify in judges: it is entirely result-oriented. This is so because the plain
meaning of the Constitution does not decide any difficult or controversial cases.”).
198. For example, during the Court’s October 2008 Term, the Justices split 5–4 in 29.1% of
decided cases and 6–3 in 16.5% of decided cases.  In other words, there were at least three
dissenters in nearly half of the cases that the Court decided. See SCOTUSblog, Decisions by
Final Vote—OT08, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/vote2.pdf (last
visited Sept. 21, 2009).
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V. WHAT ABOUT THE DEMOCRATS?
A likely objection to my argument is that it lacks evenhandedness.
I have singled out Republican politicians for criticism, but Democrats
too have long been on both sides of the issue of judicial deference.
Compare, for example, the views of supporters of the Warren Court
with progressive-era objections to the Lochner Court and the deferen-
tial posture of the New Deal Court vis-a`-vis the federal govern-
ment.199  Moreover, during the past decade or so, liberal academics
have been spilling ink accusing the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts of
judicial activism,200 so they may also be guilty of using rhetoric that
does not match up with the reality of their own basic orientations to-
wards judicial review.  In addition, one might disapprove of Demo-
crats who talk the general language of rights and “empathy” but who
seemingly apply those concepts overwhelmingly to racial minorities
and women, and not, for example, to gun owners, homeowners, fe-
tuses, and white school and job applicants.  One might also condemn
Democrats who elect to emphasize stare decisis in lieu of defending
their constitutional commitments on their own terms.201  Finally, one
might criticize Democrats who avoid discussing the issue of judges be-
cause they believe that it is not politically advantageous for them to
do so.
I shall briefly consider those five points in the order that I have
articulated them.  First, my purpose is not to establish that Democrats
are more candid or principled than Republicans as a general matter.  I
neither maintain nor presuppose that Democrats have been consistent
199. See, e.g., supra notes 13–86 and accompanying text.
200. For a collection of such criticism, see LINDQUIST & CROSS, supra note 2, at 8–9; Young,
supra note 12, at 1139–40.  For example, Jack Balkin and Sandy Levinson have written that the
judicial activism of the Warren Court “has been replaced with one much harsher and more con-
servative, protecting state governments from civil rights plaintiffs, state officers from federal
regulatory mandates, property owners from environmental regulation, and whites from affirma-
tive action.”  Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution,
87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1092 (2001).
201. Here is how one of the newest Democrats in Congress discussed abortion during the
Roberts hearings, albeit while he was still a moderate Republican:
I am very seldom a user of charts, but on this one I prepared a chart because it
speaks—a little too heavy to lift, but it speaks louder than just—thank you, Senator
Grassley.  Thirty-eight cases where Roe has been taken up, and I don’t want to coin any
phrases on super precedents.  We will leave that to the Supreme Court.  But would you
think that Roe might be a super-duper precedent in light—
[Laughter.]
Chairman SPECTER—of 38 occasions to overrule it?
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the United
States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 145 (2005) (statement of Sen.
Arlen Specter, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
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over time.  Second, I am not particularly concerned in this context
about how law professors, either liberal or conservative, talk about
judges.  My focus is on how the individuals who possess the most rhe-
torical and actual power in our society—namely, national politicians,
particularly presidents—have been talking about judges in the present
and over the past several decades.  It is the president who “tells us
stories about ourselves, and in so doing he tells us what sort of people
we are, how we are constituted as a community.  We take from him
not only our policies but our national self-identity.”202  Third, if the
case can be made that Democratic politicians have consistently made
claims to the effect that “everyone has the same rights,” then Demo-
crats deserve criticism for not meaning what they say or else for saying
it poorly.  The language of rights always implies a theory of rights that
will give rights to some and not to others.  In the abstract, rights talk is
vacuous.  Fourth, it seems potentially disingenuous and counter-
productive for Democrats who fear legal change from the Roberts
Court to emphasize the virtue of fidelity to precedent more than they
articulate a constitutional vision that may persuade their fellow
Americans.
Most serious of all may be the fifth charge—that Democratic politi-
cians tend to avoid talking about the judicial stakes in national elec-
tions because they have made the calculation that they have little to
gain and much to lose.203  For example, throughout the 2008 cam-
paign, then-Senator Obama did not emphasize the likely conse-
quences should Senator McCain win the presidency and nominate a
replacement for Justice Stevens, Souter, or Ginsburg.  Yet Obama
surely knew that the impact on constitutional law could have been
enormous.  True, a Democratic Senate might have limited some of the
options available to McCain.  But Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito nonetheless might have no longer required
Justice Kennedy’s vote on the issues that most deeply divide the coun-
try and the Court.
None of this, however, diminishes the culpability of Republican pol-
iticians for relentlessly railing against judicial activism.  When one
compares the leadership of the Republican Party with the leadership
of the Democratic Party, there is a striking difference in the extent to
202. MARY E. STUCKEY, THE PRESIDENT AS INTERPRETER-IN-CHIEF 1 (1991).
203. The issue of underlying causes—that is, why it appears politically unprofitable for Demo-
cratic politicians to talk much about judges—is worthy of examination.  Part of the answer may
be that the Republican Party wants more from courts these days than does the Democratic
Party, so that the issue of judicial selection is more mobilizing for Republicans than for
Democrats.
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which each decries activist judges.  Republican presidents, presidential
candidates, and members of Congress regularly condemn government
by judiciary, judges who legislate from the bench, judges who impose
their personal values on the people, and judges who ignore the clear
meaning of the Constitution.  Democratic presidents, presidential can-
didates, and members of Congress do not.204
Compare, for example, President George W. Bush’s rhetoric docu-
mented throughout this inquiry with President Obama’s rhetoric when
he singled out three judicial qualities in nominating Judge Sotomayor
to replace Justice Souter:
First and foremost is a rigorous intellect—a mastery of the law
. . . .  Second is a recognition of the limits of the judicial role, an
understanding that a judge’s job is to interpret, not make, law; to
approach decisions without any particular ideology or agenda, but
rather a commitment to impartial justice; a respect for precedent
and a determination to faithfully apply the law to the facts at hand.
. . .  And yet, these qualities alone are insufficient. . . .  For as
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once said, “The life
of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.”  Experience
being tested by obstacles and barriers, by hardship and misfortune;
experience insisting, persisting, and ultimately overcoming those
barriers.  It is experience that can give a person a common touch
and a sense of compassion; an understanding of how the world
works and how ordinary people live.  And that is why it is a neces-
sary ingredient in the kind of justice we need on the Supreme
Court.205
204. One study found 127 references to “legislating from the bench” in Congress from 1990 to
2006; Republicans made more than 75% of the references. LINDQUIST & CROSS, supra note 2, at
19 (citing Bruce G. Peabody, Legislating from the Bench: A Definition and a Defense, 11 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 185, 197 (2007)).  No doubt, “liberals in Congress have begun to express
concern for judicial activism,” but “conservative complaints about judicial activism remain pre-
dominant.” LINDQUIST & CROSS, supra note 2, at 20.
205. Press Release, Office of the White House Press Secretary, Remarks by the President in
Nominating Judge Sonia Sotomayor to the United States Supreme Court (May 26, 2009), availa-
ble at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-in-Nominating-
Judge-Sonia-Sotomayor-to-the-United-States-Supreme-Court.  Here is the full Holmes quote:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.  The seed of every new
growth within its sphere has been a felt necessity.  The form of continuity has been kept
up by reasonings purporting to reduce every thing to a logical sequence; but that form
is nothing but the evening dress which the new-comer puts on to make itself presenta-
ble according to conventional requirements.  The important phenomenon is the man
underneath it, not the coat; the justice and reasonableness of a decision, not its consis-
tency with previously held views.  No one will ever have a truly philosophic mastery
over the law who does not habitually consider the forces outside of it which have made
it what it is.  More than that, he must remember that as it embodies the story of a
nation’s development through many centuries, the law finds its philosophy not in self-
consistency, which it must always fail in so long as it continues to grow, but in history
and the nature of human needs.
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To be sure, Republican presidents have strongly emphasized Obama’s
second factor—the difference between interpreting law and making
law.  But Obama’s rhetoric is a far cry from talk of unaccountable,
activist judges who legislate from the bench or who insist that “the
Constitution means” something other than “what it says.”206  The dif-
ference in tone and substance is particularly significant in light of
Obama’s third factor—personal experience—which actually becomes
most relevant when there is not a clear distinction between interpret-
ing law and making law.
The differences between Bush’s rhetoric and Obama’s rhetoric are
typical of the contrasting ways in which Republican politicians and
Democratic politicians tend to talk—or not talk—about the subject of
judicial activism.  One searches the 2008 Democratic Party Platform in
vain for any such talk.207  Likewise, earlier Democratic platforms “did
not contain similar objections to judicial activism.”208
CONCLUSION
I have sought to destabilize a certain political rhetoric.  No matter
how much “Republican candidates continue to campaign on a plat-
form of judicial restraint,”209 it is false to insist that respect for popu-
lar majorities or fidelity to the Constitution distinguishes the
Republican Party from the Democratic Party.  There is too much evi-
dence to the contrary in the actual commitments of the modern Re-
publican Party, in the voting behavior of the Justices who are most
admired in the Party, and in the pervasive reality of irreconcilable dis-
agreement that characterizes our heterogeneous constitutional cul-
ture.210  Neither side has a monopoly on deference or fidelity.  The
real debates are substantive debates about close constitutional
questions.
Like Democrats, Republicans should be required to defend their
constitutional commitments on their own terms, and not with mislead-
ing talk about judicial activism.  It may be troubling in a democracy—
in a political community that deeply values the accountability of the
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Book Notices, 14 AM. L. REV. 233, 234 (1880).
206. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (quoting President George W. Bush).
207. See DEMOCRATIC NAT’L PARTY, PLATFORM STANDING COMM., RENEWING AMERICA’S
PROMISE 54–55, available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/papers_pdf/78283.pdf (last visited
Sept. 21, 2009).
208. LINDQUIST & CROSS, supra note 2, at 18.
209. KECK, supra note 13, at 291.
210. For example, Justice Sotomayor was confirmed for a seat on the Court by a “largely
party-line vote.”  Charlie Savage, Senate Confirms Sotomayor for the Supreme Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 7, 2009, at A1.
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government to the governed—that one of the two major political par-
ties continues to campaign in part based on a conception of the judi-
cial role that it does not in fact possess, and in part based on assertions
about the nature of American constitutional law that are not in fact
true.  This may not be much of a problem for voters who know better,
whether they be Democrats or Republicans who accurately appre-
hend that activism talk really signifies substantive disagreement with
particular views on particular issues, and nothing more.  But it may be
a serious problem for voters who do not know better—specifically, for
the large, relatively nonideological middle in America that decides
elections.211  The Court possesses great power because neither party is
committed to judicial deference as a general matter and because it is
often impossible for the Justices “just” to “follow the law” when exe-
cuting their responsibilities.  Citizens should understand the judicial
stakes when they vote for presidents and senators.212
211. See, e.g., MORRIS P. FIORINA ET AL., CULTURE WAR?  THE MYTH OF A POLARIZED
AMERICA (2006).  Fiorina finds significant polarization among political elites but not much po-
larization among most Americans. See id. at 32 (“Public opinion data are far more consistent
with the argument that a polarized political class makes voters appear polarized when they are
not, than with the argument that a polarized electorate is forcing the political class to take more
polarized positions.”).
212. The empirical evidence regarding what Americans believe about judicial activism ap-
pears mixed.  On the one hand, a 2005 survey by the American Bar Association found that 56%
of Americans strongly or somewhat believed that judicial activism was a contemporary “crisis,”
while 46% strongly or somewhat agreed with the assertion that judges were “arrogant, out-of-
control and unaccountable.” LINDQUIST & CROSS, supra note 2, at 10 (citing Martha Neil, Half
of U.S. Sees “Judicial Activism Crisis”, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, http://www.abanet.org/
journal/ereport/s30survey.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2009)).  Lindquist and Cross also document
increasing references to judicial activism in major newspapers, as well as books published in the
popular press that address the issue.  A prominent example is Mark Levin’s 2005 New York
Times bestseller Men in Black, which was widely popular despite being “essentially a complaint
about decisions with which he disagrees, with no neutral principle to define judicial activism
other than his personal vision of the Constitution.” LINDQUIST & CROSS, supra note 2, at 13
(footnote omitted).  Lindquist and Cross conclude that “even though judicial activism is often
associated with the Warren Court era, it continues to be a matter of major public concern to-
day.” Id. at 12.
On the other hand, some evidence suggests a different story about what Americans believe
about judicial activism.  In the context of the Supreme Court confirmation hearing of Justice
Alito, political scientists James Gibson and Gregory Caldeira asked a nationally representative
sample some questions about judicial activism.  Surprisingly, only 39% of respondents had ever
heard of the term.  Gibson and Caldeira further found that self-identified Democrats and
Republicans were equally likely to approve of judicial activism (40% and 37%, respectively),
although Republicans were more likely than Democrats to reject activism (55% to 38%, respec-
tively), which also means that Republicans were less likely than Democrats to report no opinion
regarding activism (8% and 22%, respectively).  Gibson and Caldeira further found that 34% of
self-identified liberals supported judicial activism, as did 36% of self-identified conservatives.
Perhaps most importantly, 45% of self-identified centrists had a favorable view of judicial activ-
ism.  Gibson concluded that “[i]f the findings from this survey are of any guidance, then ideologi-
cally focused debates about judicial activism are unlikely to provide advantage to one side or the
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I am not suggesting that complete candor and transparency is al-
ways a virtue in public political or constitutional argument.  We
should not desire a politics in which the two parties endlessly fight
about “who we are” as a people in the most candid, explicit, and un-
compromising fashion.  Statesmanship is required to negotiate reason-
able, irreconcilable disagreement in a land as diverse as America.213
But conceding that, it seems difficult to excuse, let alone to justify, the
rhetoric of judicial activism on grounds of statesmanship or as other-
wise worth the costs.  Citizens who do not know the sort of judges for
whom they are likely voting may not be pleased with the judges they
end up getting.  And instrumental considerations aside, there are dig-
nitary harms associated with misleading the public about the nature
and function of judicial review.  It is wrong to deceive people—and
thereby to diminish their apprehension of the governmental institu-
tions under which they live—in the absence of very good reason for
doing so.214
If the rhetoric of judicial activism can finally be laid to rest, the
quality of public debates about the role of courts in American society
will likely improve.  Perhaps then, the collective focus, particularly
during national elections, will be on debating which substantive vi-
sions provide the best account of America’s living constitutional tradi-
tion215 and can sustain the allegiance of a nation that often divides
over the content of its constitutional character.
Of course, whether the Republican Party has any incentive to stop
using the rhetoric of judicial activism is an entirely different question.
Presumably, the party would have ceased deploying activism talk long
ago if it did not possess political force—if it did not appeal to a certain
other.”  James L. Gibson, Americans Quite Tolerant of Activist Judges, MILLER-MCCUNE, July
16, 2009, http://www.miller-mccune.com/legal_affairs/americans-quite-tolerant-of-activist-judges-
1348.
213. For a discussion of the relationship between statesmanship and social solidarity in the
context of judging, see generally Siegel, supra note 191.
214. I cannot do justice here to the questions of whether, why, and when it matters how politi-
cal leaders and citizens talk about judges.  Nor can I address at a general level of abstraction the
question of what qualifies as an appropriate level of honesty and candor in public constitutional
argument.
215. For discussions of the idea of a constitutional vision, see, for example, Neil S. Siegel,
“Equal Citizenship Stature”: Justice Ginsburg’s Constitutional Vision, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 799
(2009) (symposium honoring the jurisprudence of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg); Robert C. Post
& Reva B. Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 25 (J.M.
Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009).  For a discussion of constitutional visions that focuses on the
politics of certain transformative presidents, see generally WHITTINGTON, supra note 88, at
53–58.
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segment of the population whose support the party seeks.216  Despite
a temporary lull in activism rhetoric during the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee’s questioning of Judge Sonia Sotomayor,217 the disconnect be-
tween rhetoric and reality shows no signs of approaching the breaking
point.218  For the time being at least, the Republican Party will con-
tinue to deserve criticism for distorting public debate by clothing its
substantive constitutional vision in the deceptive procedural dress
known as the rhetoric of judicial activism.219
216. See, e.g., LINDQUIST & CROSS, supra note 2, at 28 (“Judicial activism would not be
wielded as a political epithet if it did not have political value.”).
217. During the Sotomayor hearing, the Senators on the Judiciary Committee devoted only 2
percent of their total words to the subject of judicial activism, and the Democratic committee
members were responsible for 72 percent of that 2 percent.  The Republican committee mem-
bers spent a paltry 362 words on the topic.  Yi Zhou, One Panel, Two Hearings, N.Y. TIMES, July
19, 2009, at WK3 (reporting the results of a New York Times analysis of Senate transcripts).
218. See, e.g., Sessions, supra note 85, at 8A (“I don’t believe that Judge Sotomayor has the
deep-rooted convictions necessary to resist the siren call of judicial activism.  She has evoked its
mantra too often.  As someone who cares deeply about our great heritage of law, I must with-
hold my consent.”); David Stout, McCain Opposes Sotomayor, N.Y. TIMES, August 4, 2009, at
A14  (“Mr. McCain said he had ‘great respect’ for the judge but could not accept her ‘long public
record of judicial activism’ . . . .”).  The New York Times observed,
During three days of debate on the Senate floor, Republicans labeled Judge Sotomayor
a judicial activist, criticizing several of her speeches about foreign law and judicial di-
versity—including a now-famous line lauding a “wise Latina” judge—as well as her
votes in cases involving Second Amendment rights, property rights and a racial discrim-
ination claim brought by white firefighters in New Haven.
Savage, supra note 210, at A1.
219. I cannot analyze the Sotomayor hearing here.  Among other things, it is worth inquiring
why Sotomayor, notwithstanding the popularity of the president at the time and a very favorable
composition of the Senate, elected to follow the approach of Chief Justice Roberts and make
statements about the nature of constitutional law and the role of a justice that are very difficult
to defend intellectually. See, e.g., supra note 79.  To the extent that Sotomayor, like Roberts, was
simply following the path of least resistance to confirmation, a key question is why that is the
path of least resistance.
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